The Focusrite Scarlett Gen 4 Solo has Air and Phantom Power controls
on analogue input ChimeraOS#2 (the Gen 3 Solo had these controls on analogue
input ChimeraOS#1). Add air_input_first and phantom_first device info options
to cater for this.

These options are similar to the level_input_first option that was
added for the Gen 3 Solo, but these new options do not require
adjusting the index of the control.

Signed-off-by: Geoffrey D. Bennett <g@b4.vu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/19511f18895b8c094985a4a5691fbc1dc028c108.1703612638.git.g@b4.vu

[ Upstream commit 2b44760 ]

Running the following two commands in parallel on a multi-processor
AArch64 machine can sporadically produce an unexpected warning about
duplicate histogram entries:

 $ while true; do
     echo hist:key=id.syscall:val=hitcount > \
       /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/raw_syscalls/sys_enter/trigger
     cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/raw_syscalls/sys_enter/hist
     sleep 0.001
   done
 $ stress-ng --sysbadaddr $(nproc)

The warning looks as follows:

[ 2911.172474] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 2911.173111] Duplicates detected: 1
[ 2911.173574] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 12247 at kernel/trace/tracing_map.c:983 tracing_map_sort_entries+0x3e0/0x408
[ 2911.174702] Modules linked in: iscsi_ibft(E) iscsi_boot_sysfs(E) rfkill(E) af_packet(E) nls_iso8859_1(E) nls_cp437(E) vfat(E) fat(E) ena(E) tiny_power_button(E) qemu_fw_cfg(E) button(E) fuse(E) efi_pstore(E) ip_tables(E) x_tables(E) xfs(E) libcrc32c(E) aes_ce_blk(E) aes_ce_cipher(E) crct10dif_ce(E) polyval_ce(E) polyval_generic(E) ghash_ce(E) gf128mul(E) sm4_ce_gcm(E) sm4_ce_ccm(E) sm4_ce(E) sm4_ce_cipher(E) sm4(E) sm3_ce(E) sm3(E) sha3_ce(E) sha512_ce(E) sha512_arm64(E) sha2_ce(E) sha256_arm64(E) nvme(E) sha1_ce(E) nvme_core(E) nvme_auth(E) t10_pi(E) sg(E) scsi_mod(E) scsi_common(E) efivarfs(E)
[ 2911.174738] Unloaded tainted modules: cppc_cpufreq(E):1
[ 2911.180985] CPU: 2 PID: 12247 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G            E      6.7.0-default #2 1b58bbb22c97e4399dc09f92d309344f69c44a01
[ 2911.182398] Hardware name: Amazon EC2 c7g.8xlarge/, BIOS 1.0 11/1/2018
[ 2911.183208] pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 2911.184038] pc : tracing_map_sort_entries+0x3e0/0x408
[ 2911.184667] lr : tracing_map_sort_entries+0x3e0/0x408
[ 2911.185310] sp : ffff8000a1513900
[ 2911.185750] x29: ffff8000a1513900 x28: ffff0003f272fe80 x27: 0000000000000001
[ 2911.186600] x26: ffff0003f272fe80 x25: 0000000000000030 x24: 0000000000000008
[ 2911.187458] x23: ffff0003c5788000 x22: ffff0003c16710c8 x21: ffff80008017f180
[ 2911.188310] x20: ffff80008017f000 x19: ffff80008017f180 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 2911.189160] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff8000a15134b8
[ 2911.190015] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 205d373432323154 x12: 5b5d313131333731
[ 2911.190844] x11: 00000000fffeffff x10: 00000000fffeffff x9 : ffffd1b78274a13c
[ 2911.191716] x8 : 000000000017ffe8 x7 : c0000000fffeffff x6 : 000000000057ffa8
[ 2911.192554] x5 : ffff0012f6c24ec0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff2e5b72b5d000
[ 2911.193404] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0003ff254480
[ 2911.194259] Call trace:
[ 2911.194626]  tracing_map_sort_entries+0x3e0/0x408
[ 2911.195220]  hist_show+0x124/0x800
[ 2911.195692]  seq_read_iter+0x1d4/0x4e8
[ 2911.196193]  seq_read+0xe8/0x138
[ 2911.196638]  vfs_read+0xc8/0x300
[ 2911.197078]  ksys_read+0x70/0x108
[ 2911.197534]  __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x38
[ 2911.198046]  invoke_syscall+0x78/0x108
[ 2911.198553]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xd0/0xf8
[ 2911.199157]  do_el0_svc+0x28/0x40
[ 2911.199613]  el0_svc+0x40/0x178
[ 2911.200048]  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x13c/0x158
[ 2911.200621]  el0t_64_sync+0x1a8/0x1b0
[ 2911.201115] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

The problem appears to be caused by CPU reordering of writes issued from
__tracing_map_insert().

The check for the presence of an element with a given key in this
function is:

 val = READ_ONCE(entry->val);
 if (val && keys_match(key, val->key, map->key_size)) ...

The write of a new entry is:

 elt = get_free_elt(map);
 memcpy(elt->key, key, map->key_size);
 entry->val = elt;

The "memcpy(elt->key, key, map->key_size);" and "entry->val = elt;"
stores may become visible in the reversed order on another CPU. This
second CPU might then incorrectly determine that a new key doesn't match
an already present val->key and subsequently insert a new element,
resulting in a duplicate.

Fix the problem by adding a write barrier between
"memcpy(elt->key, key, map->key_size);" and "entry->val = elt;", and for
good measure, also use WRITE_ONCE(entry->val, elt) for publishing the
element. The sequence pairs with the mentioned "READ_ONCE(entry->val);"
and the "val->key" check which has an address dependency.

The barrier is placed on a path executed when adding an element for
a new key. Subsequent updates targeting the same key remain unaffected.

From the user's perspective, the issue was introduced by commit
c193707 ("tracing: Remove code which merges duplicates"), which
followed commit cbf4100 ("tracing: Add support to detect and avoid
duplicates"). The previous code operated differently; it inherently
expected potential races which result in duplicates but merged them
later when they occurred.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240122150928.27725-1-petr.pavlu@suse.com

Fixes: c193707 ("tracing: Remove code which merges duplicates")
Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…volume

commit 7081929 upstream.

If the source file descriptor to the snapshot ioctl refers to a deleted
subvolume, we get the following abort:

  BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -2)
  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 833 at fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1875 create_pending_snapshot+0x1040/0x1190 [btrfs]
  Modules linked in: pata_acpi btrfs ata_piix libata scsi_mod virtio_net blake2b_generic xor net_failover virtio_rng failover scsi_common rng_core raid6_pq libcrc32c
  CPU: 0 PID: 833 Comm: t_snapshot_dele Not tainted 6.7.0-rc6 #2
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-1.fc39 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:create_pending_snapshot+0x1040/0x1190 [btrfs]
  RSP: 0018:ffffa09c01337af8 EFLAGS: 00010282
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9982053e7c78 RCX: 0000000000000027
  RDX: ffff99827dc20848 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff99827dc20840
  RBP: ffffa09c01337c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffa09c01337998
  R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffffffb96da248 R12: fffffffffffffffe
  R13: ffff99820535bb28 R14: ffff99820b7bd000 R15: ffff99820381ea80
  FS:  00007fe20aadabc0(0000) GS:ffff99827dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 0000559a120b502f CR3: 00000000055b6000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   ? create_pending_snapshot+0x1040/0x1190 [btrfs]
   ? __warn+0x81/0x130
   ? create_pending_snapshot+0x1040/0x1190 [btrfs]
   ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0
   ? handle_bug+0x3a/0x70
   ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
   ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
   ? create_pending_snapshot+0x1040/0x1190 [btrfs]
   ? create_pending_snapshot+0x1040/0x1190 [btrfs]
   create_pending_snapshots+0x92/0xc0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_commit_transaction+0x66b/0xf40 [btrfs]
   btrfs_mksubvol+0x301/0x4d0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_mksnapshot+0x80/0xb0 [btrfs]
   __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x1c2/0x1d0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0xc4/0x150 [btrfs]
   btrfs_ioctl+0x8a6/0x2650 [btrfs]
   ? kmem_cache_free+0x22/0x340
   ? do_sys_openat2+0x97/0xe0
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xd0
   do_syscall_64+0x46/0xf0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
  RIP: 0033:0x7fe20abe83af
  RSP: 002b:00007ffe6eff1360 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007fe20abe83af
  RDX: 00007ffe6eff23c0 RSI: 0000000050009417 RDI: 0000000000000003
  RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007fe20ad16cd0
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: 00007ffe6eff13c0 R14: 00007fe20ad45000 R15: 0000559a120b6d58
   </TASK>
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
  BTRFS: error (device vdc: state A) in create_pending_snapshot:1875: errno=-2 No such entry
  BTRFS info (device vdc: state EA): forced readonly
  BTRFS warning (device vdc: state EA): Skipping commit of aborted transaction.
  BTRFS: error (device vdc: state EA) in cleanup_transaction:2055: errno=-2 No such entry

This happens because create_pending_snapshot() initializes the new root
item as a copy of the source root item. This includes the refs field,
which is 0 for a deleted subvolume. The call to btrfs_insert_root()
therefore inserts a root with refs == 0. btrfs_get_new_fs_root() then
finds the root and returns -ENOENT if refs == 0, which causes
create_pending_snapshot() to abort.

Fix it by checking the source root's refs before attempting the
snapshot, but after locking subvol_sem to avoid racing with deletion.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Reviewed-by: Sweet Tea Dorminy <sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me>
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 169410e ]

These three bpf_map_{lookup,update,delete}_elem() helpers are also
available for sleepable bpf program, so add the corresponding lock
assertion for sleepable bpf program, otherwise the following warning
will be reported when a sleepable bpf program manipulates bpf map under
interpreter mode (aka bpf_jit_enable=0):

  WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 4985 at kernel/bpf/helpers.c:40 ......
  CPU: 3 PID: 4985 Comm: test_progs Not tainted 6.6.0+ #2
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) ......
  RIP: 0010:bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x54/0x60
  ......
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   ? __warn+0xa5/0x240
   ? bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x54/0x60
   ? report_bug+0x1ba/0x1f0
   ? handle_bug+0x40/0x80
   ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x50
   ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
   ? __pfx_bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x10/0x10
   ? rcu_lockdep_current_cpu_online+0x65/0xb0
   ? rcu_is_watching+0x23/0x50
   ? bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x54/0x60
   ? __pfx_bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x10/0x10
   ___bpf_prog_run+0x513/0x3b70
   __bpf_prog_run32+0x9d/0xd0
   ? __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable_recur+0xad/0x120
   ? __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable_recur+0x3e/0x120
   bpf_trampoline_6442580665+0x4d/0x1000
   __x64_sys_getpgid+0x5/0x30
   ? do_syscall_64+0x36/0xb0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
   </TASK>

Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231204140425.1480317-2-houtao@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit fc3a553 ]

An issue occurred while reading an ELF file in libbpf.c during fuzzing:

	Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
	0x0000000000958e97 in bpf_object.collect_prog_relos () at libbpf.c:4206
	4206 in libbpf.c
	(gdb) bt
	#0 0x0000000000958e97 in bpf_object.collect_prog_relos () at libbpf.c:4206
	#1 0x000000000094f9d6 in bpf_object.collect_relos () at libbpf.c:6706
	#2 0x000000000092bef3 in bpf_object_open () at libbpf.c:7437
	#3 0x000000000092c046 in bpf_object.open_mem () at libbpf.c:7497
	#4 0x0000000000924afa in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput () at fuzz/bpf-object-fuzzer.c:16
	#5 0x000000000060be11 in testblitz_engine::fuzzer::Fuzzer::run_one ()
	#6 0x000000000087ad92 in tracing::span::Span::in_scope ()
	#7 0x00000000006078aa in testblitz_engine::fuzzer::util::walkdir ()
	#8 0x00000000005f3217 in testblitz_engine::entrypoint::main::{{closure}} ()
	#9 0x00000000005f2601 in main ()
	(gdb)

scn_data was null at this code(tools/lib/bpf/src/libbpf.c):

	if (rel->r_offset % BPF_INSN_SZ || rel->r_offset >= scn_data->d_size) {

The scn_data is derived from the code above:

	scn = elf_sec_by_idx(obj, sec_idx);
	scn_data = elf_sec_data(obj, scn);

	relo_sec_name = elf_sec_str(obj, shdr->sh_name);
	sec_name = elf_sec_name(obj, scn);
	if (!relo_sec_name || !sec_name)// don't check whether scn_data is NULL
		return -EINVAL;

In certain special scenarios, such as reading a malformed ELF file,
it is possible that scn_data may be a null pointer

Signed-off-by: Mingyi Zhang <zhangmingyi5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Liu <liuxin350@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Changye Wu <wuchangye@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231221033947.154564-1-liuxin350@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 47bf0f8 ]

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.5.0-kfd-fkuehlin torvalds#276 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/8:2/2676 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff9435aae95c88 ((work_completion)(&svm_bo->eviction_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x52/0x550

but task is already holding lock:
ffff9435cd8e1720 (&svms->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: svm_range_deferred_list_work+0xe8/0x340 [amdgpu]

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #2 (&svms->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __mutex_lock+0x97/0xd30
       kfd_ioctl_alloc_memory_of_gpu+0x6d/0x3c0 [amdgpu]
       kfd_ioctl+0x1b2/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
       __x64_sys_ioctl+0x86/0xc0
       do_syscall_64+0x39/0x80
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

-> #1 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
       down_read+0x42/0x160
       svm_range_evict_svm_bo_worker+0x8b/0x340 [amdgpu]
       process_one_work+0x27a/0x540
       worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
       kthread+0xeb/0x120
       ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20

-> #0 ((work_completion)(&svm_bo->eviction_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
       __lock_acquire+0x1426/0x2200
       lock_acquire+0xc1/0x2b0
       __flush_work+0x80/0x550
       __cancel_work_timer+0x109/0x190
       svm_range_bo_release+0xdc/0x1c0 [amdgpu]
       svm_range_free+0x175/0x180 [amdgpu]
       svm_range_deferred_list_work+0x15d/0x340 [amdgpu]
       process_one_work+0x27a/0x540
       worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
       kthread+0xeb/0x120
       ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  (work_completion)(&svm_bo->eviction_work) --> &mm->mmap_lock --> &svms->lock

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&svms->lock);
                               lock(&mm->mmap_lock);
                               lock(&svms->lock);
  lock((work_completion)(&svm_bo->eviction_work));

I believe this cannot really lead to a deadlock in practice, because
svm_range_evict_svm_bo_worker only takes the mmap_read_lock if the BO
refcount is non-0. That means it's impossible that svm_range_bo_release
is running concurrently. However, there is no good way to annotate this.

To avoid the problem, take a BO reference in
svm_range_schedule_evict_svm_bo instead of in the worker. That way it's
impossible for a BO to get freed while eviction work is pending and the
cancel_work_sync call in svm_range_bo_release can be eliminated.

v2: Use svm_bo_ref_unless_zero and explained why that's safe. Also
removed redundant checks that are already done in
amdkfd_fence_enable_signaling.

Signed-off-by: Felix Kuehling <felix.kuehling@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Philip Yang <philip.yang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 2a9de42 ]

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.5.0-kfd-yangp #2289 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/0:2/996 is trying to acquire lock:
        (srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: __synchronize_srcu+0x5/0x1a0

but task is already holding lock:
        ((work_completion)(&svms->deferred_list_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
	process_one_work+0x211/0x560

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #3 ((work_completion)(&svms->deferred_list_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
        __flush_work+0x88/0x4f0
        svm_range_list_lock_and_flush_work+0x3d/0x110 [amdgpu]
        svm_range_set_attr+0xd6/0x14c0 [amdgpu]
        kfd_ioctl+0x1d1/0x630 [amdgpu]
        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0

-> #2 (&info->lock#2){+.+.}-{3:3}:
        __mutex_lock+0x99/0xc70
        amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_restore_process_bos+0x54/0x740 [amdgpu]
        restore_process_helper+0x22/0x80 [amdgpu]
        restore_process_worker+0x2d/0xa0 [amdgpu]
        process_one_work+0x29b/0x560
        worker_thread+0x3d/0x3d0

-> #1 ((work_completion)(&(&process->restore_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
        __flush_work+0x88/0x4f0
        __cancel_work_timer+0x12c/0x1c0
        kfd_process_notifier_release_internal+0x37/0x1f0 [amdgpu]
        __mmu_notifier_release+0xad/0x240
        exit_mmap+0x6a/0x3a0
        mmput+0x6a/0x120
        do_exit+0x322/0xb90
        do_group_exit+0x37/0xa0
        __x64_sys_exit_group+0x18/0x20
        do_syscall_64+0x38/0x80

-> #0 (srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}:
        __lock_acquire+0x1521/0x2510
        lock_sync+0x5f/0x90
        __synchronize_srcu+0x4f/0x1a0
        __mmu_notifier_release+0x128/0x240
        exit_mmap+0x6a/0x3a0
        mmput+0x6a/0x120
        svm_range_deferred_list_work+0x19f/0x350 [amdgpu]
        process_one_work+0x29b/0x560
        worker_thread+0x3d/0x3d0

other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
  srcu --> &info->lock#2 --> (work_completion)(&svms->deferred_list_work)

Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
        lock((work_completion)(&svms->deferred_list_work));
                        lock(&info->lock#2);
			lock((work_completion)(&svms->deferred_list_work));
        sync(srcu);

Signed-off-by: Philip Yang <Philip.Yang@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <felix.kuehling@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…triggers

I managed to hit following use after free warning recently:

[ 2169.711665] ==================================================================
[ 2169.714009] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timers.part.0+0x179/0x4c0
[ 2169.716293] Write of size 8 at addr ffff88812b326a70 by task swapper/4/0

[ 2169.719022] CPU: 4 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2jiri+ #2
[ 2169.720974] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 2169.722457] Call Trace:
[ 2169.722756]  <IRQ>
[ 2169.723024]  dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0xb0
[ 2169.723417]  print_report+0xc5/0x630
[ 2169.723807]  ? __virt_addr_valid+0x126/0x2b0
[ 2169.724268]  kasan_report+0xbe/0xf0
[ 2169.724667]  ? __run_timers.part.0+0x179/0x4c0
[ 2169.725116]  ? __run_timers.part.0+0x179/0x4c0
[ 2169.725570]  __run_timers.part.0+0x179/0x4c0
[ 2169.726003]  ? call_timer_fn+0x320/0x320
[ 2169.726404]  ? lock_downgrade+0x3a0/0x3a0
[ 2169.726820]  ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x14/0x20
[ 2169.727257]  ? ktime_get+0x92/0x150
[ 2169.727630]  ? lapic_next_deadline+0x35/0x60
[ 2169.728069]  run_timer_softirq+0x40/0x80
[ 2169.728475]  __do_softirq+0x1a1/0x509
[ 2169.728866]  irq_exit_rcu+0x95/0xc0
[ 2169.729241]  sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6b/0x80
[ 2169.729718]  </IRQ>
[ 2169.729993]  <TASK>
[ 2169.730259]  asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20
[ 2169.730755] RIP: 0010:default_idle+0x13/0x20
[ 2169.731190] Code: c0 08 00 00 00 4d 29 c8 4c 01 c7 4c 29 c2 e9 72 ff ff ff cc cc cc cc 8b 05 9a 7f 1f 02 85 c0 7e 07 0f 00 2d cf 69 43 00 fb f4 <fa> c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 93 04 00
[ 2169.732759] RSP: 0018:ffff888100dbfe10 EFLAGS: 00000242
[ 2169.733264] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff888100d9c200 RCX: ffffffff8241bd62
[ 2169.733925] RDX: ffffed109a848b15 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff8127ac55
[ 2169.734566] RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed109a848b14
[ 2169.735200] R10: ffff8884d42458a3 R11: 000000000000ba7e R12: ffffffff83d7d3a0
[ 2169.735835] R13: 1ffff110201b7fc6 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888100d9c200
[ 2169.736478]  ? ct_kernel_exit.constprop.0+0xa2/0xc0
[ 2169.736954]  ? do_idle+0x285/0x290
[ 2169.737323]  default_idle_call+0x63/0x90
[ 2169.737730]  do_idle+0x285/0x290
[ 2169.738089]  ? arch_cpu_idle_exit+0x30/0x30
[ 2169.738511]  ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x80
[ 2169.738917]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x12e/0x200
[ 2169.739417]  cpu_startup_entry+0x30/0x40
[ 2169.739825]  start_secondary+0x19a/0x1c0
[ 2169.740229]  ? set_cpu_sibling_map+0xbd0/0xbd0
[ 2169.740673]  secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x15d/0x16b
[ 2169.741179]  </TASK>

[ 2169.741686] Allocated by task 1098:
[ 2169.742058]  kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2169.742456]  kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
[ 2169.742852]  __kasan_kmalloc+0x83/0x90
[ 2169.743246]  mlx5_dpll_probe+0xf5/0x3c0 [mlx5_dpll]
[ 2169.743730]  auxiliary_bus_probe+0x62/0xb0
[ 2169.744148]  really_probe+0x127/0x590
[ 2169.744534]  __driver_probe_device+0xd2/0x200
[ 2169.744973]  device_driver_attach+0x6b/0xf0
[ 2169.745402]  bind_store+0x90/0xe0
[ 2169.745761]  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1df/0x2a0
[ 2169.746210]  vfs_write+0x41f/0x790
[ 2169.746579]  ksys_write+0xc7/0x160
[ 2169.746947]  do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x140
[ 2169.747333]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e

[ 2169.748049] Freed by task 1220:
[ 2169.748393]  kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2169.748789]  kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
[ 2169.749188]  kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x50
[ 2169.749621]  poison_slab_object+0x106/0x180
[ 2169.750044]  __kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x50
[ 2169.750451]  kfree+0x118/0x330
[ 2169.750792]  mlx5_dpll_remove+0xf5/0x110 [mlx5_dpll]
[ 2169.751271]  auxiliary_bus_remove+0x2e/0x40
[ 2169.751694]  device_release_driver_internal+0x24b/0x2e0
[ 2169.752191]  unbind_store+0xa6/0xb0
[ 2169.752563]  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1df/0x2a0
[ 2169.753004]  vfs_write+0x41f/0x790
[ 2169.753381]  ksys_write+0xc7/0x160
[ 2169.753750]  do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x140
[ 2169.754132]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e

[ 2169.754847] Last potentially related work creation:
[ 2169.755315]  kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2169.755709]  __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x9b/0xf0
[ 2169.756165]  __queue_work+0x382/0x8f0
[ 2169.756552]  call_timer_fn+0x126/0x320
[ 2169.756941]  __run_timers.part.0+0x2ea/0x4c0
[ 2169.757376]  run_timer_softirq+0x40/0x80
[ 2169.757782]  __do_softirq+0x1a1/0x509

[ 2169.758387] Second to last potentially related work creation:
[ 2169.758924]  kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2169.759322]  __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x9b/0xf0
[ 2169.759773]  __queue_work+0x382/0x8f0
[ 2169.760156]  call_timer_fn+0x126/0x320
[ 2169.760550]  __run_timers.part.0+0x2ea/0x4c0
[ 2169.760978]  run_timer_softirq+0x40/0x80
[ 2169.761381]  __do_softirq+0x1a1/0x509

[ 2169.761998] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88812b326a00
                which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256
[ 2169.763061] The buggy address is located 112 bytes inside of
                freed 256-byte region [ffff88812b326a00, ffff88812b326b00)

[ 2169.764346] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[ 2169.764866] page:000000000f2b1e89 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x12b324
[ 2169.765731] head:000000000f2b1e89 order:2 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
[ 2169.766484] anon flags: 0x200000000000840(slab|head|node=0|zone=2)
[ 2169.767048] page_type: 0xffffffff()
[ 2169.767422] raw: 0200000000000840 ffff888100042b40 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
[ 2169.768183] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 2169.768899] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

[ 2169.769649] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 2169.770116]  ffff88812b326900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 2169.770805]  ffff88812b326980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 2169.771485] >ffff88812b326a00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 2169.772173]                                                              ^
[ 2169.772787]  ffff88812b326a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 2169.773477]  ffff88812b326b00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 2169.774160] ==================================================================
[ 2169.774845] ==================================================================

I didn't manage to reproduce it. Though the issue seems to be obvious.
There is a chance that the mlx5_dpll_remove() calls
cancel_delayed_work() when the work runs and manages to re-arm itself.
In that case, after delay timer triggers next attempt to queue it,
it works with freed memory.

Fix this by using cancel_delayed_work_sync() instead which makes sure
that work is done when it returns.

Fixes: 496fd0a ("mlx5: Implement SyncE support using DPLL infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240206164328.360313-1-jiri@resnulli.us
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

…kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.8, take #2

- Avoid dropping the page refcount twice when freeing an unlinked
  page-table subtree.

Hou Tao says:

====================
Fix the read of vsyscall page through bpf

From: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>

Hi,

As reported by syzboot [1] and [2], when trying to read vsyscall page
by using bpf_probe_read_kernel() or bpf_probe_read(), oops may happen.

Thomas Gleixner had proposed a test patch [3], but it seems that no
formal patch is posted after about one month [4], so I post it instead
and add an Originally-by tag in patch #2.

Patch #1 makes is_vsyscall_vaddr() being a common helper. Patch #2 fixes
the problem by disallowing vsyscall page read for
copy_from_kernel_nofault(). Patch #3 adds one test case to ensure the
read of vsyscall page through bpf is rejected. Please see individual
patches for more details.

Comments are always welcome.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAG48ez06TZft=ATH1qh2c5mpS5BT8UakwNkzi6nvK5_djC-4Nw@mail.gmail.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CABOYnLynjBoFZOf3Z4BhaZkc5hx_kHfsjiW+UWLoB=w33LvScw@mail.gmail.com/
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/87r0jwquhv.ffs@tglx/
[4]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/e24b125c-8ff4-9031-6c53-67ff2e01f316@huaweicloud.com/

Change Log:
v3:
 * rephrase commit message for patch #1 & #2 (Sohil)
 * reword comments in copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed() (Sohil)
 * add Rvb tag for patch #1 and Acked-by tag for patch #3 (Sohil, Yonghong)

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240126115423.3943360-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com/
  * move is_vsyscall_vaddr to asm/vsyscall.h instead (Sohil)
  * elaborate on the reason for disallowing of vsyscall page read in
    copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed() (Sohil)
  * update the commit message of patch #2 to more clearly explain how
    the oops occurs. (Sohil)
  * update the commit message of patch #3 to explain the expected return
    values of various bpf helpers (Yonghong)

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240119073019.1528573-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com/
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240202103935.3154011-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

With parameters CONFIG_RISCV_PMU_LEGACY=y and CONFIG_RISCV_PMU_SBI=n
linux kernel crashes when you try perf record:

$ perf record ls
[ 46.749286] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
[ 46.750199] Oops [#1]
[ 46.750342] Modules linked in:
[ 46.750608] CPU: 0 PID: 107 Comm: perf-exec Not tainted 6.6.0 #2
[ 46.750906] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
[ 46.751184] epc : 0x0
[ 46.751430] ra : arch_perf_update_userpage+0x54/0x13e
[ 46.751680] epc : 0000000000000000 ra : ffffffff8072ee52 sp : ff2000000022b8f0
[ 46.751958] gp : ffffffff81505988 tp : ff6000000290d400 t0 : ff2000000022b9c0
[ 46.752229] t1 : 0000000000000001 t2 : 0000000000000003 s0 : ff2000000022b930
[ 46.752451] s1 : ff600000028fb000 a0 : 0000000000000000 a1 : ff600000028fb000
[ 46.752673] a2 : 0000000ae2751268 a3 : 00000000004fb708 a4 : 0000000000000004
[ 46.752895] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 000000000017ffe3 a7 : 00000000000000d2
[ 46.753117] s2 : ff600000028fb000 s3 : 0000000ae2751268 s4 : 0000000000000000
[ 46.753338] s5 : ffffffff8153e290 s6 : ff600000863b9000 s7 : ff60000002961078
[ 46.753562] s8 : ff60000002961048 s9 : ff60000002961058 s10: 0000000000000001
[ 46.753783] s11: 0000000000000018 t3 : ffffffffffffffff t4 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 46.754005] t5 : ff6000000292270c t6 : ff2000000022bb30
[ 46.754179] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 000000000000000c
[ 46.754653] Code: Unable to access instruction at 0xffffffffffffffec.
[ 46.754939] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 46.755131] note: perf-exec[107] exited with irqs disabled
[ 46.755546] note: perf-exec[107] exited with preempt_count 4

This happens because in the legacy case the ctr_get_width function was not
defined, but it is used in arch_perf_update_userpage.

Also remove extra check in riscv_pmu_ctr_get_width_mask

Signed-off-by: Vadim Shakirov <vadim.shakirov@syntacore.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Fixes: cc4c07c ("drivers: perf: Implement perf event mmap support  in the SBI backend")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227170002.188671-3-vadim.shakirov@syntacore.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>

…git/netfilter/nf

Pablo Neira Ayuso says:

====================
Netfilter fixes for net

Patch #1 restores NFPROTO_INET with nft_compat, from Ignat Korchagin.

Patch #2 fixes an issue with bridge netfilter and broadcast/multicast
packets.

There is a day 0 bug in br_netfilter when used with connection tracking.

Conntrack assumes that an nf_conn structure that is not yet added to
hash table ("unconfirmed"), is only visible by the current cpu that is
processing the sk_buff.

For bridge this isn't true, sk_buff can get cloned in between, and
clones can be processed in parallel on different cpu.

This patch disables NAT and conntrack helpers for multicast packets.

Patch #3 adds a selftest to cover for the br_netfilter bug.

netfilter pull request 24-02-29

* tag 'nf-24-02-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf:
  selftests: netfilter: add bridge conntrack + multicast test case
  netfilter: bridge: confirm multicast packets before passing them up the stack
  netfilter: nf_tables: allow NFPROTO_INET in nft_(match/target)_validate()
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240229000135.8780-1-pablo@netfilter.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

Eduard Zingerman says:

====================
check bpf_func_state->callback_depth when pruning states

This patch-set fixes bug in states pruning logic hit in mailing list
discussion [0]. The details of the fix are in patch #1.

The main idea for the fix belongs to Yonghong Song,
mine contribution is merely in review and test cases.

There are some changes in verification performance:

File                       Program        Insns    (DIFF)  States  (DIFF)
-------------------------  -------------  ---------------  --------------
pyperf600_bpf_loop.bpf.o   on_event          +15 (+0.42%)     +0 (+0.00%)
strobemeta_bpf_loop.bpf.o  on_event        +857 (+37.95%)   +60 (+38.96%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o    syncookie_tc   +2892 (+30.39%)  +109 (+36.33%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o    syncookie_xdp  +2892 (+30.01%)  +109 (+36.09%)

(when tested on a subset of selftests identified by
 selftests/bpf/veristat.cfg and Cilium bpf object files from [4])

Changelog:
v2 [2] -> v3:
- fixes for verifier.c commit message as suggested by Yonghong;
- patch-set re-rerouted to 'bpf' tree as suggested in [2];
- patch for test_tcp_custom_syncookie is sent separately to 'bpf-next' [3].
- veristat results updated using 'bpf' tree as baseline and clang 16.

v1 [1] -> v2:
- patch #2 commit message updated to better reflect verifier behavior
  with regards to checkpoints tree (suggested by Yonghong);
- veristat results added (suggested by Andrii).

[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/9b251840-7cb8-4d17-bd23-1fc8071d8eef@linux.dev/
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240212143832.28838-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240216150334.31937-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240222150300.14909-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/
[4] https://github.com/anakryiko/cilium
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240222154121.6991-1-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

…git/netfilter/nf

Pablo Neira Ayuso says:

====================
Netfilter fixes for net

The following patchset contains fixes for net:

Patch #1 disallows anonymous sets with timeout, except for dynamic sets.
         Anonymous sets with timeouts using the pipapo set backend makes
         no sense from userspace perspective.

Patch #2 rejects constant sets with timeout which has no practical usecase.
         This kind of set, once bound, contains elements that expire but
         no new elements can be added.

Patch #3 restores custom conntrack expectations with NFPROTO_INET,
         from Florian Westphal.

Patch #4 marks rhashtable anonymous set with timeout as dead from the
         commit path to avoid that async GC collects these elements. Rules
         that refers to the anonymous set get released with no mutex held
         from the commit path.

Patch #5 fixes a UBSAN shift overflow in H.323 conntrack helper,
         from Lena Wang.

netfilter pull request 24-03-07

* tag 'nf-24-03-07' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf:
  netfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: Add protection for bmp length out of range
  netfilter: nf_tables: mark set as dead when unbinding anonymous set with timeout
  netfilter: nft_ct: fix l3num expectations with inet pseudo family
  netfilter: nf_tables: reject constant set with timeout
  netfilter: nf_tables: disallow anonymous set with timeout flag
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240307021545.149386-1-pablo@netfilter.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 682dc13 ]

With parameters CONFIG_RISCV_PMU_LEGACY=y and CONFIG_RISCV_PMU_SBI=n
linux kernel crashes when you try perf record:

$ perf record ls
[ 46.749286] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
[ 46.750199] Oops [ChimeraOS#1]
[ 46.750342] Modules linked in:
[ 46.750608] CPU: 0 PID: 107 Comm: perf-exec Not tainted 6.6.0 ChimeraOS#2
[ 46.750906] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
[ 46.751184] epc : 0x0
[ 46.751430] ra : arch_perf_update_userpage+0x54/0x13e
[ 46.751680] epc : 0000000000000000 ra : ffffffff8072ee52 sp : ff2000000022b8f0
[ 46.751958] gp : ffffffff81505988 tp : ff6000000290d400 t0 : ff2000000022b9c0
[ 46.752229] t1 : 0000000000000001 t2 : 0000000000000003 s0 : ff2000000022b930
[ 46.752451] s1 : ff600000028fb000 a0 : 0000000000000000 a1 : ff600000028fb000
[ 46.752673] a2 : 0000000ae2751268 a3 : 00000000004fb708 a4 : 0000000000000004
[ 46.752895] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 000000000017ffe3 a7 : 00000000000000d2
[ 46.753117] s2 : ff600000028fb000 s3 : 0000000ae2751268 s4 : 0000000000000000
[ 46.753338] s5 : ffffffff8153e290 s6 : ff600000863b9000 s7 : ff60000002961078
[ 46.753562] s8 : ff60000002961048 s9 : ff60000002961058 s10: 0000000000000001
[ 46.753783] s11: 0000000000000018 t3 : ffffffffffffffff t4 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 46.754005] t5 : ff6000000292270c t6 : ff2000000022bb30
[ 46.754179] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 000000000000000c
[ 46.754653] Code: Unable to access instruction at 0xffffffffffffffec.
[ 46.754939] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 46.755131] note: perf-exec[107] exited with irqs disabled
[ 46.755546] note: perf-exec[107] exited with preempt_count 4

This happens because in the legacy case the ctr_get_width function was not
defined, but it is used in arch_perf_update_userpage.

Also remove extra check in riscv_pmu_ctr_get_width_mask

Signed-off-by: Vadim Shakirov <vadim.shakirov@syntacore.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Fixes: cc4c07c ("drivers: perf: Implement perf event mmap support  in the SBI backend")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227170002.188671-3-vadim.shakirov@syntacore.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 682dc13 ]

With parameters CONFIG_RISCV_PMU_LEGACY=y and CONFIG_RISCV_PMU_SBI=n
linux kernel crashes when you try perf record:

$ perf record ls
[ 46.749286] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
[ 46.750199] Oops [ChimeraOS#1]
[ 46.750342] Modules linked in:
[ 46.750608] CPU: 0 PID: 107 Comm: perf-exec Not tainted 6.6.0 ChimeraOS#2
[ 46.750906] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
[ 46.751184] epc : 0x0
[ 46.751430] ra : arch_perf_update_userpage+0x54/0x13e
[ 46.751680] epc : 0000000000000000 ra : ffffffff8072ee52 sp : ff2000000022b8f0
[ 46.751958] gp : ffffffff81505988 tp : ff6000000290d400 t0 : ff2000000022b9c0
[ 46.752229] t1 : 0000000000000001 t2 : 0000000000000003 s0 : ff2000000022b930
[ 46.752451] s1 : ff600000028fb000 a0 : 0000000000000000 a1 : ff600000028fb000
[ 46.752673] a2 : 0000000ae2751268 a3 : 00000000004fb708 a4 : 0000000000000004
[ 46.752895] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 000000000017ffe3 a7 : 00000000000000d2
[ 46.753117] s2 : ff600000028fb000 s3 : 0000000ae2751268 s4 : 0000000000000000
[ 46.753338] s5 : ffffffff8153e290 s6 : ff600000863b9000 s7 : ff60000002961078
[ 46.753562] s8 : ff60000002961048 s9 : ff60000002961058 s10: 0000000000000001
[ 46.753783] s11: 0000000000000018 t3 : ffffffffffffffff t4 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 46.754005] t5 : ff6000000292270c t6 : ff2000000022bb30
[ 46.754179] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 000000000000000c
[ 46.754653] Code: Unable to access instruction at 0xffffffffffffffec.
[ 46.754939] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 46.755131] note: perf-exec[107] exited with irqs disabled
[ 46.755546] note: perf-exec[107] exited with preempt_count 4

This happens because in the legacy case the ctr_get_width function was not
defined, but it is used in arch_perf_update_userpage.

Also remove extra check in riscv_pmu_ctr_get_width_mask

Signed-off-by: Vadim Shakirov <vadim.shakirov@syntacore.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Fixes: cc4c07c ("drivers: perf: Implement perf event mmap support  in the SBI backend")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227170002.188671-3-vadim.shakirov@syntacore.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 5dbbe7e ]

It seems we also need to reserve a region of 81 MiB called "removed_mem"
otherwise we can easily hit the following error with higher RAM usage:

  [ 1467.809274] Internal error: synchronous external abort: 0000000096000010 [#2] SMP

Fixes: eee9602 ("arm64: dts: qcom: qcm6490: Add device-tree for Fairphone 5")
Signed-off-by: Luca Weiss <luca.weiss@fairphone.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Dybcio <konrad.dybcio@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231229-fp5-reserved-mem-v1-1-87bb818f1397@fairphone.com
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 27571c6 ]

Switch to a new plane state requires unreferencing of all held surfaces.
In the work required for mob cursors the mapped surfaces started being
cached but the variable indicating whether the surface is currently
mapped was not being reset. This leads to crashes as the duplicated
state, incorrectly, indicates the that surface is mapped even when
no surface is present. That's because after unreferencing the surface
it's perfectly possible for the plane to be backed by a bo instead of a
surface.

Reset the surface mapped flag when unreferencing the plane state surface
to fix null derefs in cleanup. Fixes crashes in KDE KWin 6.0 on Wayland:

Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 4 PID: 2533 Comm: kwin_wayland Not tainted 6.7.0-rc3-vmwgfx #2
Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
RIP: 0010:vmw_du_cursor_plane_cleanup_fb+0x124/0x140 [vmwgfx]
Code: 00 00 00 75 3a 48 83 c4 10 5b 5d c3 cc cc cc cc 48 8b b3 a8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 99 90 43 c0 e8 93 c5 db ca 48 8b 83 a8 00 00 00 <48> 8b 78 28 e8 e3 f>
RSP: 0018:ffffb6b98216fa80 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff969d84cdcb00 RCX: 0000000000000027
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff969e75f21600
RBP: ffff969d4143dc50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb6b98216f920
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff969e7feb3b10 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000000027b R15: ffff969d49c9fc00
FS:  00007f1e8f1b4180(0000) GS:ffff969e75f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 0000000104006004 CR4: 00000000003706f0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __die+0x23/0x70
 ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4e0
 ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x180
 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
 ? vmw_du_cursor_plane_cleanup_fb+0x124/0x140 [vmwgfx]
 drm_atomic_helper_cleanup_planes+0x9b/0xc0
 commit_tail+0xd1/0x130
 drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x11a/0x140
 drm_atomic_commit+0x97/0xd0
 ? __pfx___drm_printfn_info+0x10/0x10
 drm_atomic_helper_update_plane+0xf5/0x160
 drm_mode_cursor_universal+0x10e/0x270
 drm_mode_cursor_common+0x102/0x230
 ? __pfx_drm_mode_cursor2_ioctl+0x10/0x10
 drm_ioctl_kernel+0xb2/0x110
 drm_ioctl+0x26d/0x4b0
 ? __pfx_drm_mode_cursor2_ioctl+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_drm_ioctl+0x10/0x10
 vmw_generic_ioctl+0xa4/0x110 [vmwgfx]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x94/0xd0
 do_syscall_64+0x61/0xe0
 ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0xaf/0xd0
 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2b/0x40
 ? do_syscall_64+0x70/0xe0
 ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0xaf/0xd0
 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2b/0x40
 ? do_syscall_64+0x70/0xe0
 ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x180
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
RIP: 0033:0x7f1e93f279ed
Code: 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 c8 31 c0 48 8d 45 10 c7 45 b0 10 00 00 00 48 89 45 b8 48 8d 45 d0 48 89 45 c0 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <89> c2 3d 00 f0 ff f>
RSP: 002b:00007ffca0faf600 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055db876ed2c0 RCX: 00007f1e93f279ed
RDX: 00007ffca0faf6c0 RSI: 00000000c02464bb RDI: 0000000000000015
RBP: 00007ffca0faf650 R08: 000055db87184010 R09: 0000000000000007
R10: 000055db886471a0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffca0faf6c0
R13: 00000000c02464bb R14: 0000000000000015 R15: 00007ffca0faf790
 </TASK>
Modules linked in: snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_ine>
CR2: 0000000000000028
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:vmw_du_cursor_plane_cleanup_fb+0x124/0x140 [vmwgfx]
Code: 00 00 00 75 3a 48 83 c4 10 5b 5d c3 cc cc cc cc 48 8b b3 a8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 99 90 43 c0 e8 93 c5 db ca 48 8b 83 a8 00 00 00 <48> 8b 78 28 e8 e3 f>
RSP: 0018:ffffb6b98216fa80 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff969d84cdcb00 RCX: 0000000000000027
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff969e75f21600
RBP: ffff969d4143dc50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb6b98216f920
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff969e7feb3b10 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000000027b R15: ffff969d49c9fc00
FS:  00007f1e8f1b4180(0000) GS:ffff969e75f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 0000000104006004 CR4: 00000000003706f0

Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin <zack.rusin@broadcom.com>
Fixes: 485d98d ("drm/vmwgfx: Add support for CursorMob and CursorBypass 4")
Reported-by: Stefan Hoffmeister <stefan.hoffmeister@econos.de>
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/misc/-/issues/34
Cc: Martin Krastev <martin.krastev@broadcom.com>
Cc: Maaz Mombasawala <maaz.mombasawala@broadcom.com>
Cc: Ian Forbes <ian.forbes@broadcom.com>
Cc: Broadcom internal kernel review list <bcm-kernel-feedback-list@broadcom.com>
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.19+
Acked-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Maaz Mombasawala <maaz.mombasawala@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin Krastev <martin.krastev@broadcom.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231224052540.605040-1-zack.rusin@broadcom.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 50ed48c ]

Tests with hot-plugging crytpo cards on KVM guests with debug
kernel build revealed an use after free for the load field of
the struct zcrypt_card. The reason was an incorrect reference
handling of the zcrypt card object which could lead to a free
of the zcrypt card object while it was still in use.

This is an example of the slab message:

    kernel: 0x00000000885a7512-0x00000000885a7513 @offset=1298. First byte 0x68 instead of 0x6b
    kernel: Allocated in zcrypt_card_alloc+0x36/0x70 [zcrypt] age=18046 cpu=3 pid=43
    kernel:  kmalloc_trace+0x3f2/0x470
    kernel:  zcrypt_card_alloc+0x36/0x70 [zcrypt]
    kernel:  zcrypt_cex4_card_probe+0x26/0x380 [zcrypt_cex4]
    kernel:  ap_device_probe+0x15c/0x290
    kernel:  really_probe+0xd2/0x468
    kernel:  driver_probe_device+0x40/0xf0
    kernel:  __device_attach_driver+0xc0/0x140
    kernel:  bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xd0
    kernel:  __device_attach+0x114/0x198
    kernel:  bus_probe_device+0xb4/0xc8
    kernel:  device_add+0x4d2/0x6e0
    kernel:  ap_scan_adapter+0x3d0/0x7c0
    kernel:  ap_scan_bus+0x5a/0x3b0
    kernel:  ap_scan_bus_wq_callback+0x40/0x60
    kernel:  process_one_work+0x26e/0x620
    kernel:  worker_thread+0x21c/0x440
    kernel: Freed in zcrypt_card_put+0x54/0x80 [zcrypt] age=9024 cpu=3 pid=43
    kernel:  kfree+0x37e/0x418
    kernel:  zcrypt_card_put+0x54/0x80 [zcrypt]
    kernel:  ap_device_remove+0x4c/0xe0
    kernel:  device_release_driver_internal+0x1c4/0x270
    kernel:  bus_remove_device+0x100/0x188
    kernel:  device_del+0x164/0x3c0
    kernel:  device_unregister+0x30/0x90
    kernel:  ap_scan_adapter+0xc8/0x7c0
    kernel:  ap_scan_bus+0x5a/0x3b0
    kernel:  ap_scan_bus_wq_callback+0x40/0x60
    kernel:  process_one_work+0x26e/0x620
    kernel:  worker_thread+0x21c/0x440
    kernel:  kthread+0x150/0x168
    kernel:  __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58
    kernel:  ret_from_fork+0xa/0x30
    kernel: Slab 0x00000372022169c0 objects=20 used=18 fp=0x00000000885a7c88 flags=0x3ffff00000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1ffff)
    kernel: Object 0x00000000885a74b8 @offset=1208 fp=0x00000000885a7c88
    kernel: Redzone  00000000885a74b0: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb                          ........
    kernel: Object   00000000885a74b8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b  kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
    kernel: Object   00000000885a74c8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b  kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
    kernel: Object   00000000885a74d8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b  kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
    kernel: Object   00000000885a74e8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b  kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
    kernel: Object   00000000885a74f8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b  kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
    kernel: Object   00000000885a7508: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 68 4b 6b 6b 6b a5  kkkkkkkkkkhKkkk.
    kernel: Redzone  00000000885a7518: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb                          ........
    kernel: Padding  00000000885a756c: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a              ZZZZZZZZZZZZ
    kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 387 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 6.8.0-HF #2
    kernel: Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (KVM/Linux)
    kernel: Call Trace:
    kernel:  [<00000000ca5ab5b8>] dump_stack_lvl+0x90/0x120
    kernel:  [<00000000c99d78bc>] check_bytes_and_report+0x114/0x140
    kernel:  [<00000000c99d53cc>] check_object+0x334/0x3f8
    kernel:  [<00000000c99d820c>] alloc_debug_processing+0xc4/0x1f8
    kernel:  [<00000000c99d852e>] get_partial_node.part.0+0x1ee/0x3e0
    kernel:  [<00000000c99d94ec>] ___slab_alloc+0xaf4/0x13c8
    kernel:  [<00000000c99d9e38>] __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x78/0xb8
    kernel:  [<00000000c99dc8dc>] __kmalloc+0x434/0x590
    kernel:  [<00000000c9b4c0ce>] ext4_htree_store_dirent+0x4e/0x1c0
    kernel:  [<00000000c9b908a2>] htree_dirblock_to_tree+0x17a/0x3f0
    kernel:  [<00000000c9b919dc>] ext4_htree_fill_tree+0x134/0x400
    kernel:  [<00000000c9b4b3d0>] ext4_dx_readdir+0x160/0x2f0
    kernel:  [<00000000c9b4bedc>] ext4_readdir+0x5f4/0x760
    kernel:  [<00000000c9a7efc4>] iterate_dir+0xb4/0x280
    kernel:  [<00000000c9a7f1ea>] __do_sys_getdents64+0x5a/0x120
    kernel:  [<00000000ca5d6946>] __do_syscall+0x256/0x310
    kernel:  [<00000000ca5eea10>] system_call+0x70/0x98
    kernel: INFO: lockdep is turned off.
    kernel: FIX kmalloc-96: Restoring Poison 0x00000000885a7512-0x00000000885a7513=0x6b
    kernel: FIX kmalloc-96: Marking all objects used

The fix is simple: Before use of the queue not only the queue object
but also the card object needs to increase it's reference count
with a call to zcrypt_card_get(). Similar after use of the queue
not only the queue but also the card object's reference count is
decreased with zcrypt_card_put().

Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

When kernel is built without debuginfo, running 'perf record' with
--off-cpu results in segfault as below:

   ./perf record --off-cpu -e dummy sleep 1
   libbpf: kernel BTF is missing at '/sys/kernel/btf/vmlinux', was CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF enabled?
   libbpf: failed to find '.BTF' ELF section in /lib/modules/6.13.0-rc3+/build/vmlinux
   libbpf: failed to find valid kernel BTF
   Segmentation fault (core dumped)

The backtrace pointed to:

   #0  0x00000000100fb17c in btf.type_cnt ()
   ChimeraOS#1  0x00000000100fc1a8 in btf_find_by_name_kind ()
   ChimeraOS#2  0x00000000100fc38c in btf.find_by_name_kind ()
   ChimeraOS#3  0x00000000102ee3ac in off_cpu_prepare ()
   ChimeraOS#4  0x000000001002f78c in cmd_record ()
   ChimeraOS#5  0x00000000100aee78 in run_builtin ()
   ChimeraOS#6  0x00000000100af3e4 in handle_internal_command ()
   ChimeraOS#7  0x000000001001004c in main ()

Code sequence is:

   static void check_sched_switch_args(void)
   {
        struct btf *btf = btf__load_vmlinux_btf();
        const struct btf_type *t1, *t2, *t3;
        u32 type_id;

        type_id = btf__find_by_name_kind(btf, "btf_trace_sched_switch",
                                         BTF_KIND_TYPEDEF);

btf__load_vmlinux_btf() fails when CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF is not enabled.

Here bpf__find_by_name_kind() calls btf__type_cnt() with NULL btf value
and results in segfault.

To fix this, add a check to see if btf is not NULL before invoking
bpf__find_by_name_kind().

Reviewed-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Disha Goel <disgoel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241223135813.8175-1-atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

…rnel/git/at91/linux into soc/dt

Microchip AT91 device tree updates for v6.14 ChimeraOS#2

This update includes:
- device tree files for the SAMA7D65 SoC and its evaluation board

* tag 'at91-dt-6.14-2' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/at91/linux:
  ARM: dts: microchip: add support for sama7d65_curiosity board
  ARM: dts: microchip: add sama7d65 SoC DT

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250109164317.1154613-1-claudiu.beznea@tuxon.dev
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

The 32-bit Debian kernel 6.12 fails to boot and crashes like this:

 init (pid 65): Protection id trap (code 7)
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 65 Comm: init Not tainted 6.12.9 ChimeraOS#2
 Hardware name: 9000/778/B160L

      YZrvWESTHLNXBCVMcbcbcbcbOGFRQPDI
 PSW: 00000000000001000000000000001111 Not tainted
 r00-03  0004000f 110d39d0 109a6558 12974400
 r04-07  12a810e0 12a810e0 00000000 12a81144
 r08-11  12a81174 00000007 00000000 00000002
 r12-15  f8c55c08 0000006c 00000001 f8c55c08
 r16-19  00000002 f8c58620 002da3a8 0000004e
 r20-23  00001a46 0000000f 10754f84 00000000
 r24-27  00000000 00000003 12ae6980 1127b9d0
 r28-31  00000000 00000000 12974440 109a6558
 sr00-03  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000010
 sr04-07  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000

 IASQ: 00000000 00000000 IAOQ: 110d39d0 110d39d4
  IIR: baadf00d    ISR: 00000000  IOR: 110d39d0
  CPU:        0   CR30: 128740c0 CR31: 00000000
  ORIG_R28: 000003f3
  IAOQ[0]: 0x110d39d0
  IAOQ[1]: 0x110d39d4
  RP(r2): security_sk_free+0x70/0x1a4
 Backtrace:
  [<10d8c844>] __sk_destruct+0x2bc/0x378
  [<10d8e33c>] sk_destruct+0x68/0x8c
  [<10d8e3dc>] __sk_free+0x7c/0x148
  [<10d8e560>] sk_free+0xb8/0xf0
  [<10f6420c>] unix_release_sock+0x3ac/0x50c
  [<10f643b8>] unix_release+0x4c/0x7c
  [<10d832f8>] __sock_release+0x5c/0xf8
  [<10d833b4>] sock_close+0x20/0x44
  [<107ba52c>] __fput+0xf8/0x468
  [<107baa08>] __fput_sync+0xb4/0xd4
  [<107b471c>] sys_close+0x44/0x94
  [<10405334>] syscall_exit+0x0/0x10

Bisecting points to this commit which triggers the issue:
	commit  417c564
	Author: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
	Date:   Fri Aug 16 17:43:07 2024 +0200
	        lsm: replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls

After more analysis it seems that we don't fully implement the static calls
and jump tables yet. Additionally the functions which mark kernel memory
read-only or read-write-executable needs to be further enhanced to be able to
fully support static calls.

Enabling CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y was one possibility to trigger the issue,
although YAMA isn't the reason for the fault.

As a temporary solution disable JUMP_LABEL functionality to
avoid the crashes.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.12+

[ Upstream commit 2d2d4f6 ]

We found a timeout problem with the pldm command on our system.  The
reason is that the MCTP-I3C driver has a race condition when receiving
multiple-packet messages in multi-thread, resulting in a wrong packet
order problem.

We identified this problem by adding a debug message to the
mctp_i3c_read function.

According to the MCTP spec, a multiple-packet message must be composed
in sequence, and if there is a wrong sequence, the whole message will be
discarded and wait for the next SOM.
For example, SOM → Pkt Seq ChimeraOS#2 → Pkt Seq ChimeraOS#1 → Pkt Seq ChimeraOS#3 → EOM.

Therefore, we try to solve this problem by adding a mutex to the
mctp_i3c_read function.  Before the modification, when a command
requesting a multiple-packet message response is sent consecutively, an
error usually occurs within 100 loops.  After the mutex, it can go
through 40000 loops without any error, and it seems to run well.

Fixes: c8755b2 ("mctp i3c: MCTP I3C driver")
Signed-off-by: Leo Yang <Leo-Yang@quantatw.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250107031529.3296094-1-Leo-Yang@quantatw.com
[pabeni@redhat.com: dropped already answered question from changelog]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 1b10a51 ]

Fix a lockdep warning [1] observed during the write combining test.

The warning indicates a potential nested lock scenario that could lead
to a deadlock.

However, this is a false positive alarm because the SF lock and its
parent lock are distinct ones.

The lockdep confusion arises because the locks belong to the same object
class (i.e., struct mlx5_core_dev).

To resolve this, the code has been refactored to avoid taking both
locks. Instead, only the parent lock is acquired.

[1]
raw_ethernet_bw/2118 is trying to acquire lock:
[  213.619032] ffff88811dd75e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
               mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.620270]
[  213.620270] but task is already holding lock:
[  213.620943] ffff88810b585e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
               mlx5_wc_support_get+0x10c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.622045]
[  213.622045] other info that might help us debug this:
[  213.622778]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[  213.622778]
[  213.623465]        CPU0
[  213.623815]        ----
[  213.624148]   lock(&dev->wc_state_lock);
[  213.624615]   lock(&dev->wc_state_lock);
[  213.625071]
[  213.625071]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[  213.625071]
[  213.625805]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[  213.625805]
[  213.626522] 4 locks held by raw_ethernet_bw/2118:
[  213.627019]  #0: ffff88813f80d578 (&uverbs_dev->disassociate_srcu){.+.+}-{0:0},
                at: ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.628088]  ChimeraOS#1: ffff88810fb23930 (&file->hw_destroy_rwsem){.+.+}-{3:3},
                at: ib_init_ucontext+0x2d/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.629094]  ChimeraOS#2: ffff88810fb23878 (&file->ucontext_lock){+.+.}-{3:3},
                at: ib_init_ucontext+0x49/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.630106]  ChimeraOS#3: ffff88810b585e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3},
                at: mlx5_wc_support_get+0x10c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.631185]
[  213.631185] stack backtrace:
[  213.631718] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2118 Comm: raw_ethernet_bw Not tainted
               6.12.0-rc7_internal_net_next_mlx5_89a0ad0 ChimeraOS#1
[  213.632722] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS
               rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[  213.633785] Call Trace:
[  213.634099]
[  213.634393]  dump_stack_lvl+0x7e/0xc0
[  213.634806]  print_deadlock_bug+0x278/0x3c0
[  213.635265]  __lock_acquire+0x15f4/0x2c40
[  213.635712]  lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2d0
[  213.636120]  ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.636722]  ? mlx5_ib_enable_lb+0x24/0xa0 [mlx5_ib]
[  213.637277]  __mutex_lock+0x81/0xda0
[  213.637697]  ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.638305]  ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.638902]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
[  213.639400]  ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.640016]  mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.640615]  set_ucontext_resp+0x68/0x2b0 [mlx5_ib]
[  213.641144]  ? debug_mutex_init+0x33/0x40
[  213.641586]  mlx5_ib_alloc_ucontext+0x18e/0x7b0 [mlx5_ib]
[  213.642145]  ib_init_ucontext+0xa0/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.642679]  ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_GET_CONTEXT+0x95/0xc0
                [ib_uverbs]
[  213.643426]  ? _copy_from_user+0x46/0x80
[  213.643878]  ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0xa6b/0xc80 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.644426]  ? ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_INVOKE_WRITE+0x130/0x130
               [ib_uverbs]
[  213.645213]  ? __lock_acquire+0xa99/0x2c40
[  213.645675]  ? lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2d0
[  213.646101]  ? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.646625]  ? reacquire_held_locks+0xcf/0x1f0
[  213.647102]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x45d/0x770
[  213.647586]  ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xe0/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.648102]  ? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.648632]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x4d3/0xaa0
[  213.649060]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x4a8/0x770
[  213.649528]  do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
[  213.649947]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
[  213.650478] RIP: 0033:0x7fa179b0737b
[  213.650893] Code: ff ff ff 85 c0 79 9b 49 c7 c4 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d 4c
               89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8
               10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d
               7d 2a 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[  213.652619] RSP: 002b:00007ffd2e6d46e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
               0000000000000010
[  213.653390] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd2e6d47f8 RCX:
               00007fa179b0737b
[  213.654084] RDX: 00007ffd2e6d47e0 RSI: 00000000c0181b01 RDI:
               0000000000000003
[  213.654767] RBP: 00007ffd2e6d47c0 R08: 00007fa1799be010 R09:
               0000000000000002
[  213.655453] R10: 00007ffd2e6d4960 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:
               00007ffd2e6d487c
[  213.656170] R13: 0000000000000027 R14: 0000000000000001 R15:
               00007ffd2e6d4f70

Fixes: d98995b ("net/mlx5: Reimplement write combining test")
Signed-off-by: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Guralnik <michaelgur@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Larysa Zaremba <larysa.zaremba@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 5641e82 ]

Clear the port select structure on error so no stale values left after
definers are destroyed. That's because the mlx5_lag_destroy_definers()
always try to destroy all lag definers in the tt_map, so in the flow
below lag definers get double-destroyed and cause kernel crash:

  mlx5_lag_port_sel_create()
    mlx5_lag_create_definers()
      mlx5_lag_create_definer()     <- Failed on tt 1
        mlx5_lag_destroy_definers() <- definers[tt=0] gets destroyed
  mlx5_lag_port_sel_create()
    mlx5_lag_create_definers()
      mlx5_lag_create_definer()     <- Failed on tt 0
        mlx5_lag_destroy_definers() <- definers[tt=0] gets double-destroyed

 Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000008
 Mem abort info:
   ESR = 0x0000000096000005
   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
   SET = 0, FnV = 0
   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
   FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
 Data abort info:
   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000
   CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
 user pgtable: 64k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000112ce2e00
 [0000000000000008] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000
 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [ChimeraOS#1] PREEMPT SMP
 Modules linked in: iptable_raw bonding ip_gre ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 geneve ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel ipip tunnel4 ip_tunnel rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) mlx5_fwctl(OE) fwctl(OE) mlx5_core(OE) mlxdevm(OE) ib_core(OE) mlxfw(OE) memtrack(OE) mlx_compat(OE) openvswitch nsh nf_conncount psample xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xfrm_user xfrm_algo xt_addrtype iptable_filter iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 br_netfilter bridge stp llc netconsole overlay efi_pstore sch_fq_codel zram ip_tables crct10dif_ce qemu_fw_cfg fuse ipv6 crc_ccitt [last unloaded: mlx_compat(OE)]
  CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/u53:2 Tainted: G           OE      6.11.0+ ChimeraOS#2
  Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
  Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  Workqueue: mlx5_lag mlx5_do_bond_work [mlx5_core]
  pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
  pc : mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x24/0x2c0 [mlx5_core]
  lr : mlx5_lag_destroy_definer+0x54/0x100 [mlx5_core]
  sp : ffff800085fafb00
  x29: ffff800085fafb00 x28: ffff0000da0c8000 x27: 0000000000000000
  x26: ffff0000da0c8000 x25: ffff0000da0c8000 x24: ffff0000da0c8000
  x23: ffff0000c31f81a0 x22: 0400000000000000 x21: ffff0000da0c8000
  x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000001 x18: 0000000000000000
  x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000ffff8b0c9350
  x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff800081390d18 x12: ffff800081dc3cc0
  x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000000b10 x9 : ffff80007ab7304c
  x8 : ffff0000d00711f0 x7 : 0000000000000004 x6 : 0000000000000190
  x5 : ffff00027edb3010 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
  x2 : ffff0000d39b8000 x1 : ffff0000d39b8000 x0 : 0400000000000000
  Call trace:
   mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x24/0x2c0 [mlx5_core]
   mlx5_lag_destroy_definer+0x54/0x100 [mlx5_core]
   mlx5_lag_destroy_definers+0xa0/0x108 [mlx5_core]
   mlx5_lag_port_sel_create+0x2d4/0x6f8 [mlx5_core]
   mlx5_activate_lag+0x60c/0x6f8 [mlx5_core]
   mlx5_do_bond_work+0x284/0x5c8 [mlx5_core]
   process_one_work+0x170/0x3e0
   worker_thread+0x2d8/0x3e0
   kthread+0x11c/0x128
   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
  Code: a9025bf5 aa0003f6 a90363f7 f90023f9 (f9400400)
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Fixes: dc48516 ("net/mlx5: Lag, add support to create definers for LAG")
Signed-off-by: Mark Zhang <markzhang@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch <mbloch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 9860370 upstream.

irq_chip functions may be called in raw spinlock context. Therefore, we
must also use a raw spinlock for our own internal locking.

This fixes the following lockdep splat:

[    5.349336] =============================
[    5.353349] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
[    5.357361] 6.13.0-rc5+ torvalds#69 Tainted: G        W
[    5.363031] -----------------------------
[    5.367045] kworker/u17:1/44 is trying to lock:
[    5.371587] ffffff88018b02c0 (&chip->gpio_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8))
[    5.380079] other info that might help us debug this:
[    5.385138] context-{5:5}
[    5.387762] 5 locks held by kworker/u17:1/44:
[    5.392123] #0: ffffff8800014958 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3204)
[    5.402260] ChimeraOS#1: ffffffc082fcbdd8 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3205)
[    5.411528] ChimeraOS#2: ffffff880172c900 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach (drivers/base/dd.c:1006)
[    5.419929] ChimeraOS#3: ffffff88039c8268 (request_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/internals.h:156 kernel/irq/manage.c:1596)
[    5.428331] ChimeraOS#4: ffffff88039c80c8 (lock_class#2){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1614)
[    5.436472] stack backtrace:
[    5.439359] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 44 Comm: kworker/u17:1 Tainted: G        W          6.13.0-rc5+ torvalds#69
[    5.448690] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[    5.451656] Hardware name: xlnx,zynqmp (DT)
[    5.455845] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
[    5.461699] Call trace:
[    5.464147] show_stack+0x18/0x24 C
[    5.467821] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123)
[    5.471501] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:130)
[    5.474824] __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4828 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4898 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5176)
[    5.478758] lock_acquire (arch/arm64/include/asm/percpu.h:40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:467 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5814)
[    5.482429] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave (include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:111 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162)
[    5.486797] xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8))
[    5.490737] irq_enable (kernel/irq/internals.h:236 kernel/irq/chip.c:170 kernel/irq/chip.c:439 kernel/irq/chip.c:432 kernel/irq/chip.c:345)
[    5.494060] __irq_startup (kernel/irq/internals.h:241 kernel/irq/chip.c:180 kernel/irq/chip.c:250)
[    5.497645] irq_startup (kernel/irq/chip.c:270)
[    5.501143] __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1807)
[    5.504728] request_threaded_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:2208)

Fixes: a32c7ca ("gpio: gpio-xilinx: Add interrupt support")
Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <sean.anderson@linux.dev>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250110163354.2012654-1-sean.anderson@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit be7a6a7 ]

It isn't guaranteed that NETWORK_INTERFACE_INFO::LinkSpeed will always
be set by the server, so the client must handle any values and then
prevent oopses like below from happening:

Oops: divide error: 0000 [ChimeraOS#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1323 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7 ChimeraOS#2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41
04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs] Code: 00 00 48
89 df e8 3b cd 1b c1 41 f6 44 24 2c 04 0f 84 50 01 00 00 48 89 ef e8
e7 d0 1b c1 49 8b 44 24 18 31 d2 49 8d 7c 24 28 <48> f7 74 24 18 48 89
c3 e8 6e cf 1b c1 41 8b 6c 24 28 49 8d 7c 24
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001817be0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811230022c RCX: ffffffffc041bd99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000567 RDI: ffff888112300228
RBP: ffff888112300218 R08: fffff52000302f5f R09: ffffed1022fa58ac
R10: ffff888117d2c566 R11: 00000000fffffffe R12: ffff888112300200
R13: 000000012a15343f R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff888113f2db58
FS: 00007fe27119e740(0000) GS:ffff888148600000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fe2633c5000 CR3: 0000000124da0000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27
 ? die+0x2e/0x50
 ? do_trap+0x159/0x1b0
 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
 ? do_error_trap+0x90/0x130
 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
 ? exc_divide_error+0x39/0x50
 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
 ? asm_exc_divide_error+0x1a/0x20
 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa39/0x1460 [cifs]
 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
 ? seq_read_iter+0x42e/0x790
 seq_read_iter+0x19a/0x790
 proc_reg_read_iter+0xbe/0x110
 ? __pfx_proc_reg_read_iter+0x10/0x10
 vfs_read+0x469/0x570
 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x398/0x760
 ? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10
 ? find_held_lock+0x8a/0xa0
 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
 ksys_read+0xd3/0x170
 ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x50/0x270
 ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90
 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fe271288911
Code: 00 48 8b 15 01 25 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bd e8
20 ad 01 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d b5 a7 10 00 00 74 13 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d
00 f0 ff ff 77 4f c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec
RSP: 002b:00007ffe87c079d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000040000 RCX: 00007fe271288911
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: 00007fe2633c6000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffe87c07a00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007fe2713e6380
R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000040000
R13: 00007fe2633c6000 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

Fix this by setting cifs_server_iface::speed to a sane value (1Gbps)
by default when link speed is unset.

Cc: Shyam Prasad N <nspmangalore@gmail.com>
Cc: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Fixes: a6d8fb5 ("cifs: distribute channels across interfaces based on speed")
Reported-by: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jay Shin <jaeshin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 58f038e ]

During the update procedure, when overwrite element in a pre-allocated
htab, the freeing of old_element is protected by the bucket lock. The
reason why the bucket lock is necessary is that the old_element has
already been stashed in htab->extra_elems after alloc_htab_elem()
returns. If freeing the old_element after the bucket lock is unlocked,
the stashed element may be reused by concurrent update procedure and the
freeing of old_element will run concurrently with the reuse of the
old_element. However, the invocation of check_and_free_fields() may
acquire a spin-lock which violates the lockdep rule because its caller
has already held a raw-spin-lock (bucket lock). The following warning
will be reported when such race happens:

  BUG: scheduling while atomic: test_progs/676/0x00000003
  3 locks held by test_progs/676:
  #0: ffffffff864b0240 (rcu_read_lock_trace){....}-{0:0}, at: bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x2c0/0x830
  ChimeraOS#1: ffff88810e961188 (&htab->lockdep_key){....}-{2:2}, at: htab_map_update_elem+0x306/0x1500
  ChimeraOS#2: ffff8881f4eac1b8 (&base->softirq_expiry_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: hrtimer_cancel_wait_running+0xe9/0x1b0
  Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(O)
  Preemption disabled at:
  [<ffffffff817837a3>] htab_map_update_elem+0x293/0x1500
  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 676 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G ... 6.12.0+ ChimeraOS#11
  Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)...
  Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x70
  dump_stack+0x10/0x20
  __schedule_bug+0x120/0x170
  __schedule+0x300c/0x4800
  schedule_rtlock+0x37/0x60
  rtlock_slowlock_locked+0x6d9/0x54c0
  rt_spin_lock+0x168/0x230
  hrtimer_cancel_wait_running+0xe9/0x1b0
  hrtimer_cancel+0x24/0x30
  bpf_timer_delete_work+0x1d/0x40
  bpf_timer_cancel_and_free+0x5e/0x80
  bpf_obj_free_fields+0x262/0x4a0
  check_and_free_fields+0x1d0/0x280
  htab_map_update_elem+0x7fc/0x1500
  bpf_prog_9f90bc20768e0cb9_overwrite_cb+0x3f/0x43
  bpf_prog_ea601c4649694dbd_overwrite_timer+0x5d/0x7e
  bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x322/0x830
  __sys_bpf+0x135d/0x3ca0
  __x64_sys_bpf+0x75/0xb0
  x64_sys_call+0x1b5/0xa10
  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
  ...
  </TASK>

It seems feasible to break the reuse and refill of per-cpu extra_elems
into two independent parts: reuse the per-cpu extra_elems with bucket
lock being held and refill the old_element as per-cpu extra_elems after
the bucket lock is unlocked. However, it will make the concurrent
overwrite procedures on the same CPU return unexpected -E2BIG error when
the map is full.

Therefore, the patch fixes the lock problem by breaking the cancelling
of bpf_timer into two steps for PREEMPT_RT:
1) use hrtimer_try_to_cancel() and check its return value
2) if the timer is running, use hrtimer_cancel() through a kworker to
   cancel it again
Considering that the current implementation of hrtimer_cancel() will try
to acquire a being held softirq_expiry_lock when the current timer is
running, these steps above are reasonable. However, it also has
downside. When the timer is running, the cancelling of the timer is
delayed when releasing the last map uref. The delay is also fixable
(e.g., break the cancelling of bpf timer into two parts: one part in
locked scope, another one in unlocked scope), it can be revised later if
necessary.

It is a bit hard to decide the right fix tag. One reason is that the
problem depends on PREEMPT_RT which is enabled in v6.12. Considering the
softirq_expiry_lock lock exists since v5.4 and bpf_timer is introduced
in v5.15, the bpf_timer commit is used in the fixes tag and an extra
depends-on tag is added to state the dependency on PREEMPT_RT.

Fixes: b00628b ("bpf: Introduce bpf timers.")
Depends-on: v6.12+ with PREEMPT_RT enabled
Reported-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241106084527.4gPrMnHt@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250117101816.2101857-5-houtao@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 396f016 ]

Add read memory barrier to ensure the order of operations when accessing
control queue descriptors. Specifically, we want to avoid cases where loads
can be reordered:

1. Load ChimeraOS#1 is dispatched to read descriptor flags.
2. Load ChimeraOS#2 is dispatched to read some other field from the descriptor.
3. Load ChimeraOS#2 completes, accessing memory/cache at a point in time when the DD
   flag is zero.
4. NIC DMA overwrites the descriptor, now the DD flag is one.
5. Any fields loaded before step 4 are now inconsistent with the actual
   descriptor state.

Add read memory barrier between steps 1 and 2, so that load ChimeraOS#2 is not
executed until load ChimeraOS#1 has completed.

Fixes: 8077c72 ("idpf: add controlq init and reset checks")
Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Sridhar Samudrala <sridhar.samudrala@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Lance Richardson <rlance@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Emil Tantilov <emil.s.tantilov@intel.com>
Tested-by: Krishneil Singh <krishneil.k.singh@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit c7b87ce ]

libtraceevent parses and returns an array of argument fields, sometimes
larger than RAW_SYSCALL_ARGS_NUM (6) because it includes "__syscall_nr",
idx will traverse to index 6 (7th element) whereas sc->fmt->arg holds 6
elements max, creating an out-of-bounds access. This runtime error is
found by UBsan. The error message:

  $ sudo UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1 ./perf trace -a --max-events=1
  builtin-trace.c:1966:35: runtime error: index 6 out of bounds for type 'syscall_arg_fmt [6]'
    #0 0x5c04956be5fe in syscall__alloc_arg_fmts /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:1966
    ChimeraOS#1 0x5c04956c0510 in trace__read_syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2110
    ChimeraOS#2 0x5c04956c372b in trace__syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2436
    ChimeraOS#3 0x5c04956d2f39 in trace__init_syscalls_bpf_prog_array_maps /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3897
    ChimeraOS#4 0x5c04956d6d25 in trace__run /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:4335
    ChimeraOS#5 0x5c04956e112e in cmd_trace /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5502
    ChimeraOS#6 0x5c04956eda7d in run_builtin /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:351
    ChimeraOS#7 0x5c04956ee0a8 in handle_internal_command /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:404
    ChimeraOS#8 0x5c04956ee37f in run_argv /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:448
    ChimeraOS#9 0x5c04956ee8e9 in main /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:556
    ChimeraOS#10 0x79eb3622a3b7 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    ChimeraOS#11 0x79eb3622a47a in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    ChimeraOS#12 0x5c04955422d4 in _start (/home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf+0x4e02d4) (BuildId: 5b6cab2d59e96a4341741765ad6914a4d784dbc6)

     0.000 ( 0.014 ms): Chrome_ChildIO/117244 write(fd: 238, buf: !, count: 1)                                      = 1

Fixes: 5e58fcf ("perf trace: Allow allocating sc->arg_fmt even without the syscall tracepoint")
Signed-off-by: Howard Chu <howardchu95@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250122025519.361873-1-howardchu95@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit b32c369 ]

In "one-shot" mode, turbostat
1. takes a counter snapshot
2. forks and waits for a child
3. takes the end counter snapshot and prints the result.

But turbostat counter snapshots currently use affinity to travel
around the system so that counter reads are "local", and this
affinity must be cleared between ChimeraOS#1 and ChimeraOS#2 above.

The offending commit removed that reset that allowed the child
to run on cpu_present_set.

Fix that issue, and improve upon the original by using
cpu_possible_set for the child.  This allows the child
to also run on CPUs that hotplug online during its runtime.

Reported-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Fixes: 7bb3fe2 ("tools/power/turbostat: Obey allowed CPUs during startup")
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit be7a6a7 ]

It isn't guaranteed that NETWORK_INTERFACE_INFO::LinkSpeed will always
be set by the server, so the client must handle any values and then
prevent oopses like below from happening:

Oops: divide error: 0000 [ChimeraOS#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1323 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7 ChimeraOS#2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41
04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs] Code: 00 00 48
89 df e8 3b cd 1b c1 41 f6 44 24 2c 04 0f 84 50 01 00 00 48 89 ef e8
e7 d0 1b c1 49 8b 44 24 18 31 d2 49 8d 7c 24 28 <48> f7 74 24 18 48 89
c3 e8 6e cf 1b c1 41 8b 6c 24 28 49 8d 7c 24
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001817be0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811230022c RCX: ffffffffc041bd99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000567 RDI: ffff888112300228
RBP: ffff888112300218 R08: fffff52000302f5f R09: ffffed1022fa58ac
R10: ffff888117d2c566 R11: 00000000fffffffe R12: ffff888112300200
R13: 000000012a15343f R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff888113f2db58
FS: 00007fe27119e740(0000) GS:ffff888148600000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fe2633c5000 CR3: 0000000124da0000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27
 ? die+0x2e/0x50
 ? do_trap+0x159/0x1b0
 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
 ? do_error_trap+0x90/0x130
 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
 ? exc_divide_error+0x39/0x50
 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
 ? asm_exc_divide_error+0x1a/0x20
 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa39/0x1460 [cifs]
 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
 ? seq_read_iter+0x42e/0x790
 seq_read_iter+0x19a/0x790
 proc_reg_read_iter+0xbe/0x110
 ? __pfx_proc_reg_read_iter+0x10/0x10
 vfs_read+0x469/0x570
 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x398/0x760
 ? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10
 ? find_held_lock+0x8a/0xa0
 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
 ksys_read+0xd3/0x170
 ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x50/0x270
 ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90
 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fe271288911
Code: 00 48 8b 15 01 25 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bd e8
20 ad 01 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d b5 a7 10 00 00 74 13 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d
00 f0 ff ff 77 4f c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec
RSP: 002b:00007ffe87c079d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000040000 RCX: 00007fe271288911
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: 00007fe2633c6000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffe87c07a00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007fe2713e6380
R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000040000
R13: 00007fe2633c6000 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

Fix this by setting cifs_server_iface::speed to a sane value (1Gbps)
by default when link speed is unset.

Cc: Shyam Prasad N <nspmangalore@gmail.com>
Cc: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Fixes: a6d8fb5 ("cifs: distribute channels across interfaces based on speed")
Reported-by: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jay Shin <jaeshin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 58f038e ]

During the update procedure, when overwrite element in a pre-allocated
htab, the freeing of old_element is protected by the bucket lock. The
reason why the bucket lock is necessary is that the old_element has
already been stashed in htab->extra_elems after alloc_htab_elem()
returns. If freeing the old_element after the bucket lock is unlocked,
the stashed element may be reused by concurrent update procedure and the
freeing of old_element will run concurrently with the reuse of the
old_element. However, the invocation of check_and_free_fields() may
acquire a spin-lock which violates the lockdep rule because its caller
has already held a raw-spin-lock (bucket lock). The following warning
will be reported when such race happens:

  BUG: scheduling while atomic: test_progs/676/0x00000003
  3 locks held by test_progs/676:
  #0: ffffffff864b0240 (rcu_read_lock_trace){....}-{0:0}, at: bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x2c0/0x830
  ChimeraOS#1: ffff88810e961188 (&htab->lockdep_key){....}-{2:2}, at: htab_map_update_elem+0x306/0x1500
  ChimeraOS#2: ffff8881f4eac1b8 (&base->softirq_expiry_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: hrtimer_cancel_wait_running+0xe9/0x1b0
  Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(O)
  Preemption disabled at:
  [<ffffffff817837a3>] htab_map_update_elem+0x293/0x1500
  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 676 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G ... 6.12.0+ ChimeraOS#11
  Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)...
  Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x70
  dump_stack+0x10/0x20
  __schedule_bug+0x120/0x170
  __schedule+0x300c/0x4800
  schedule_rtlock+0x37/0x60
  rtlock_slowlock_locked+0x6d9/0x54c0
  rt_spin_lock+0x168/0x230
  hrtimer_cancel_wait_running+0xe9/0x1b0
  hrtimer_cancel+0x24/0x30
  bpf_timer_delete_work+0x1d/0x40
  bpf_timer_cancel_and_free+0x5e/0x80
  bpf_obj_free_fields+0x262/0x4a0
  check_and_free_fields+0x1d0/0x280
  htab_map_update_elem+0x7fc/0x1500
  bpf_prog_9f90bc20768e0cb9_overwrite_cb+0x3f/0x43
  bpf_prog_ea601c4649694dbd_overwrite_timer+0x5d/0x7e
  bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x322/0x830
  __sys_bpf+0x135d/0x3ca0
  __x64_sys_bpf+0x75/0xb0
  x64_sys_call+0x1b5/0xa10
  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
  ...
  </TASK>

It seems feasible to break the reuse and refill of per-cpu extra_elems
into two independent parts: reuse the per-cpu extra_elems with bucket
lock being held and refill the old_element as per-cpu extra_elems after
the bucket lock is unlocked. However, it will make the concurrent
overwrite procedures on the same CPU return unexpected -E2BIG error when
the map is full.

Therefore, the patch fixes the lock problem by breaking the cancelling
of bpf_timer into two steps for PREEMPT_RT:
1) use hrtimer_try_to_cancel() and check its return value
2) if the timer is running, use hrtimer_cancel() through a kworker to
   cancel it again
Considering that the current implementation of hrtimer_cancel() will try
to acquire a being held softirq_expiry_lock when the current timer is
running, these steps above are reasonable. However, it also has
downside. When the timer is running, the cancelling of the timer is
delayed when releasing the last map uref. The delay is also fixable
(e.g., break the cancelling of bpf timer into two parts: one part in
locked scope, another one in unlocked scope), it can be revised later if
necessary.

It is a bit hard to decide the right fix tag. One reason is that the
problem depends on PREEMPT_RT which is enabled in v6.12. Considering the
softirq_expiry_lock lock exists since v5.4 and bpf_timer is introduced
in v5.15, the bpf_timer commit is used in the fixes tag and an extra
depends-on tag is added to state the dependency on PREEMPT_RT.

Fixes: b00628b ("bpf: Introduce bpf timers.")
Depends-on: v6.12+ with PREEMPT_RT enabled
Reported-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241106084527.4gPrMnHt@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250117101816.2101857-5-houtao@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 396f016 ]

Add read memory barrier to ensure the order of operations when accessing
control queue descriptors. Specifically, we want to avoid cases where loads
can be reordered:

1. Load ChimeraOS#1 is dispatched to read descriptor flags.
2. Load ChimeraOS#2 is dispatched to read some other field from the descriptor.
3. Load ChimeraOS#2 completes, accessing memory/cache at a point in time when the DD
   flag is zero.
4. NIC DMA overwrites the descriptor, now the DD flag is one.
5. Any fields loaded before step 4 are now inconsistent with the actual
   descriptor state.

Add read memory barrier between steps 1 and 2, so that load ChimeraOS#2 is not
executed until load ChimeraOS#1 has completed.

Fixes: 8077c72 ("idpf: add controlq init and reset checks")
Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Sridhar Samudrala <sridhar.samudrala@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Lance Richardson <rlance@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Emil Tantilov <emil.s.tantilov@intel.com>
Tested-by: Krishneil Singh <krishneil.k.singh@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit c7b87ce ]

libtraceevent parses and returns an array of argument fields, sometimes
larger than RAW_SYSCALL_ARGS_NUM (6) because it includes "__syscall_nr",
idx will traverse to index 6 (7th element) whereas sc->fmt->arg holds 6
elements max, creating an out-of-bounds access. This runtime error is
found by UBsan. The error message:

  $ sudo UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1 ./perf trace -a --max-events=1
  builtin-trace.c:1966:35: runtime error: index 6 out of bounds for type 'syscall_arg_fmt [6]'
    #0 0x5c04956be5fe in syscall__alloc_arg_fmts /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:1966
    ChimeraOS#1 0x5c04956c0510 in trace__read_syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2110
    ChimeraOS#2 0x5c04956c372b in trace__syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2436
    ChimeraOS#3 0x5c04956d2f39 in trace__init_syscalls_bpf_prog_array_maps /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3897
    ChimeraOS#4 0x5c04956d6d25 in trace__run /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:4335
    ChimeraOS#5 0x5c04956e112e in cmd_trace /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5502
    ChimeraOS#6 0x5c04956eda7d in run_builtin /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:351
    ChimeraOS#7 0x5c04956ee0a8 in handle_internal_command /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:404
    ChimeraOS#8 0x5c04956ee37f in run_argv /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:448
    ChimeraOS#9 0x5c04956ee8e9 in main /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:556
    ChimeraOS#10 0x79eb3622a3b7 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    ChimeraOS#11 0x79eb3622a47a in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    ChimeraOS#12 0x5c04955422d4 in _start (/home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf+0x4e02d4) (BuildId: 5b6cab2d59e96a4341741765ad6914a4d784dbc6)

     0.000 ( 0.014 ms): Chrome_ChildIO/117244 write(fd: 238, buf: !, count: 1)                                      = 1

Fixes: 5e58fcf ("perf trace: Allow allocating sc->arg_fmt even without the syscall tracepoint")
Signed-off-by: Howard Chu <howardchu95@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250122025519.361873-1-howardchu95@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit b32c369 ]

In "one-shot" mode, turbostat
1. takes a counter snapshot
2. forks and waits for a child
3. takes the end counter snapshot and prints the result.

But turbostat counter snapshots currently use affinity to travel
around the system so that counter reads are "local", and this
affinity must be cleared between ChimeraOS#1 and ChimeraOS#2 above.

The offending commit removed that reset that allowed the child
to run on cpu_present_set.

Fix that issue, and improve upon the original by using
cpu_possible_set for the child.  This allows the child
to also run on CPUs that hotplug online during its runtime.

Reported-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Fixes: 7bb3fe2 ("tools/power/turbostat: Obey allowed CPUs during startup")
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

When COWing a relocation tree path, at relocation.c:replace_path(), we
can trigger a lockdep splat while we are in the btrfs_search_slot() call
against the relocation root. This happens in that callchain at
ctree.c:read_block_for_search() when we happen to find a child extent
buffer already loaded through the fs tree with a lockdep class set to
the fs tree. So when we attempt to lock that extent buffer through a
relocation tree we have to reset the lockdep class to the class for a
relocation tree, since a relocation tree has extent buffers that used
to belong to a fs tree and may currently be already loaded (we swap
extent buffers between the two trees at the end of replace_path()).

However we are missing calls to btrfs_maybe_reset_lockdep_class() to reset
the lockdep class at ctree.c:read_block_for_search() before we read lock
an extent buffer, just like we did for btrfs_search_slot() in commit
b40130b ("btrfs: fix lockdep splat with reloc root extent buffers").

So add the missing btrfs_maybe_reset_lockdep_class() calls before the
attempts to read lock an extent buffer at ctree.c:read_block_for_search().

The lockdep splat was reported by syzbot and it looks like this:

   ======================================================
   WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
   6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00163-gab75170520d4 #0 Not tainted
   ------------------------------------------------------
   syz.0.0/5335 is trying to acquire lock:
   ffff8880545dbc38 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146

   but task is already holding lock:
   ffff8880545dba58 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189

   which lock already depends on the new lock.

   the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

   -> ChimeraOS#2 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}:
          reacquire_held_locks+0x3eb/0x690 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5374
          __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5563 [inline]
          lock_release+0x396/0xa30 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5870
          up_write+0x79/0x590 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1629
          btrfs_force_cow_block+0x14b3/0x1fd0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:660
          btrfs_cow_block+0x371/0x830 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:755
          btrfs_search_slot+0xc01/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2153
          replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224
          merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692
          merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942
          relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754
          btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087
          btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494
          __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278
          btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655
          btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670
          vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
          __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
          __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892
          do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
          do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
          entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

   -> ChimeraOS#1 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{4:4}:
          lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849
          down_write_nested+0xa2/0x220 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1693
          btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189
          btrfs_init_new_buffer fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:5052 [inline]
          btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x41c/0x1440 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:5132
          btrfs_force_cow_block+0x526/0x1fd0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:573
          btrfs_cow_block+0x371/0x830 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:755
          btrfs_search_slot+0xc01/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2153
          btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x9c/0x1a0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4351
          btrfs_insert_empty_item fs/btrfs/ctree.h:688 [inline]
          btrfs_insert_inode_ref+0x2bb/0xf80 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:330
          btrfs_rename_exchange fs/btrfs/inode.c:7990 [inline]
          btrfs_rename2+0xcb7/0x2b90 fs/btrfs/inode.c:8374
          vfs_rename+0xbdb/0xf00 fs/namei.c:5067
          do_renameat2+0xd94/0x13f0 fs/namei.c:5224
          __do_sys_renameat2 fs/namei.c:5258 [inline]
          __se_sys_renameat2 fs/namei.c:5255 [inline]
          __x64_sys_renameat2+0xce/0xe0 fs/namei.c:5255
          do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
          do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
          entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

   -> #0 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{4:4}:
          check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline]
          check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline]
          validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904
          __lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226
          lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849
          down_read_nested+0xb5/0xa50 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1649
          btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146
          btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.h:188 [inline]
          read_block_for_search+0x718/0xbb0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1610
          btrfs_search_slot+0x1274/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2237
          replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224
          merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692
          merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942
          relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754
          btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087
          btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494
          __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278
          btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655
          btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670
          vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
          __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
          __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892
          do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
          do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
          entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

   other info that might help us debug this:

   Chain exists of:
     btrfs-tree-01 --> btrfs-tree-01/1 --> btrfs-treloc-02/1

    Possible unsafe locking scenario:

          CPU0                    CPU1
          ----                    ----
     lock(btrfs-treloc-02/1);
                                  lock(btrfs-tree-01/1);
                                  lock(btrfs-treloc-02/1);
     rlock(btrfs-tree-01);

    *** DEADLOCK ***

   8 locks held by syz.0.0/5335:
    #0: ffff88801e3ae420 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write_file+0x5e/0x200 fs/namespace.c:559
    ChimeraOS#1: ffff888052c760d0 (&fs_info->reclaim_bgs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __btrfs_balance+0x4c2/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4183
    ChimeraOS#2: ffff888052c74850 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x775/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4086
    ChimeraOS#3: ffff88801e3ae610 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: merge_reloc_root+0xf11/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1659
    ChimeraOS#4: ffff888052c76470 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x405/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288
    ChimeraOS#5: ffff888052c76498 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x405/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288
    ChimeraOS#6: ffff8880545db878 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189
    ChimeraOS#7: ffff8880545dba58 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189

   stack backtrace:
   CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5335 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00163-gab75170520d4 #0
   Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
   Call Trace:
    <TASK>
    __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
    dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
    print_circular_bug+0x13a/0x1b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2074
    check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2206
    check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline]
    check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline]
    validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904
    __lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226
    lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849
    down_read_nested+0xb5/0xa50 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1649
    btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146
    btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.h:188 [inline]
    read_block_for_search+0x718/0xbb0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1610
    btrfs_search_slot+0x1274/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2237
    replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224
    merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692
    merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942
    relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754
    btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087
    btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494
    __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278
    btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655
    btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670
    vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
    __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
    __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892
    do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
    do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
   RIP: 0033:0x7f1ac6985d29
   Code: ff ff c3 (...)
   RSP: 002b:00007f1ac63fe038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
   RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1ac6b76160 RCX: 00007f1ac6985d29
   RDX: 0000000020000180 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000007
   RBP: 00007f1ac6a01b08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
   R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
   R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 00007f1ac6b76160 R15: 00007fffda145a88
    </TASK>

Reported-by: syzbot+63913e558c084f7f8fdc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/677b3014.050a0220.3b53b0.0064.GAE@google.com/
Fixes: 9978599 ("btrfs: reduce lock contention when eb cache miss for btree search")
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

[ Upstream commit 1e8c193 ]

This commit addresses a circular locking dependency issue within the GFX
isolation mechanism. The problem was identified by a warning indicating
a potential deadlock due to inconsistent lock acquisition order.

- The `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use` and
  `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_end_use` functions previously
  acquired `enforce_isolation_mutex` and called `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl`,
  leading to potential deadlocks. ie., If `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is
  called while `enforce_isolation_mutex` is held, and
  `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler` is called while `kfd_sch_mutex` is
  held, it can create a circular dependency.

By ensuring consistent lock usage, this fix resolves the issue:

[  606.297333] ======================================================
[  606.297343] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[  606.297353] 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof ChimeraOS#19 Tainted: G           OE
[  606.297365] ------------------------------------------------------
[  606.297375] kworker/u96:3/3825 is trying to acquire lock:
[  606.297385] ffff9aa64e431cb8 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.297413]
               but task is already holding lock:
[  606.297423] ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.297725]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[  606.297738]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[  606.297749]
               -> ChimeraOS#2 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  606.297765]        __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930
[  606.297776]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  606.297786]        amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298007]        amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298225]        amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[  606.298412]        amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298603]        amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298866]        drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[  606.298880]        process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.298890]        worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.298899]        kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.298908]        ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.298919]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.298929]
               -> ChimeraOS#1 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  606.298947]        __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930
[  606.298956]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  606.298966]        amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x87/0x370 [amdgpu]
[  606.299190]        process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.299199]        worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.299208]        kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.299217]        ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.299227]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.299236]
               -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[  606.299257]        __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810
[  606.299267]        lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[  606.299276]        __flush_work+0x250/0x610
[  606.299286]        cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80
[  606.299296]        amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.299509]        amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.299723]        amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[  606.299909]        amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[  606.300101]        amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[  606.300355]        drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[  606.300369]        process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.300378]        worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.300387]        kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.300396]        ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.300406]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.300416]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[  606.300428] Chain exists of:
                 (work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work) --> &adev->enforce_isolation_mutex --> &adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex

[  606.300458]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[  606.300468]        CPU0                    CPU1
[  606.300476]        ----                    ----
[  606.300484]   lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex);
[  606.300494]                                lock(&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex);
[  606.300508]                                lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex);
[  606.300521]   lock((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work));
[  606.300536]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[  606.300546] 5 locks held by kworker/u96:3/3825:
[  606.300555]  #0: ffff9aa5aa1f5d58 ((wq_completion)comp_1.1.0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x3f5/0x680
[  606.300577]  ChimeraOS#1: ffffaa53c3c97e40 ((work_completion)(&sched->work_run_job)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d6/0x680
[  606.300600]  ChimeraOS#2: ffff9aa64e463c98 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x1c3/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.300837]  ChimeraOS#3: ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.301062]  ChimeraOS#4: ffffffff8c1a5660 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x70/0x610
[  606.301083]
               stack backtrace:
[  606.301092] CPU: 14 PID: 3825 Comm: kworker/u96:3 Tainted: G           OE      6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof ChimeraOS#19
[  606.301109] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570S GAMING X/X570S GAMING X, BIOS F7 03/22/2024
[  606.301124] Workqueue: comp_1.1.0 drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched]
[  606.301140] Call Trace:
[  606.301146]  <TASK>
[  606.301154]  dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0
[  606.301166]  dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[  606.301175]  print_circular_bug+0x26c/0x340
[  606.301187]  check_noncircular+0x157/0x170
[  606.301197]  ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x490
[  606.301213]  __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810
[  606.301230]  lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[  606.301239]  ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.301250]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  606.301261]  ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90
[  606.301274]  ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.301284]  __flush_work+0x250/0x610
[  606.301293]  ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.301305]  ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10
[  606.301318]  ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90
[  606.301331]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  606.301345]  cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80
[  606.301356]  amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.301661]  amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.302050]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  606.302069]  amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[  606.302452]  amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[  606.302862]  ? drm_sched_entity_error+0x82/0x190 [gpu_sched]
[  606.302890]  amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[  606.303366]  drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[  606.303388]  process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.303409]  worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.303424]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  606.303437]  kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.303449]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  606.303463]  ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.303476]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  606.303489]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.303512]  </TASK>

v2: Refactor lock handling to resolve circular dependency (Alex)

- Introduced a `sched_work` flag to defer the call to
  `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` until after releasing
  `enforce_isolation_mutex`.
- This change ensures that `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is called outside
  the critical section, preventing the circular dependency and deadlock.
- The `sched_work` flag is set within the mutex-protected section if
  conditions are met, and the actual function call is made afterward.
- This approach ensures consistent lock acquisition order.

Fixes: afefd6f ("drm/amdgpu: Implement Enforce Isolation Handler for KGD/KFD serialization")
Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam@amd.com>
Suggested-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 3599bae upstream.

The 32-bit Debian kernel 6.12 fails to boot and crashes like this:

 init (pid 65): Protection id trap (code 7)
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 65 Comm: init Not tainted 6.12.9 ChimeraOS#2
 Hardware name: 9000/778/B160L

      YZrvWESTHLNXBCVMcbcbcbcbOGFRQPDI
 PSW: 00000000000001000000000000001111 Not tainted
 r00-03  0004000f 110d39d0 109a6558 12974400
 r04-07  12a810e0 12a810e0 00000000 12a81144
 r08-11  12a81174 00000007 00000000 00000002
 r12-15  f8c55c08 0000006c 00000001 f8c55c08
 r16-19  00000002 f8c58620 002da3a8 0000004e
 r20-23  00001a46 0000000f 10754f84 00000000
 r24-27  00000000 00000003 12ae6980 1127b9d0
 r28-31  00000000 00000000 12974440 109a6558
 sr00-03  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000010
 sr04-07  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000

 IASQ: 00000000 00000000 IAOQ: 110d39d0 110d39d4
  IIR: baadf00d    ISR: 00000000  IOR: 110d39d0
  CPU:        0   CR30: 128740c0 CR31: 00000000
  ORIG_R28: 000003f3
  IAOQ[0]: 0x110d39d0
  IAOQ[1]: 0x110d39d4
  RP(r2): security_sk_free+0x70/0x1a4
 Backtrace:
  [<10d8c844>] __sk_destruct+0x2bc/0x378
  [<10d8e33c>] sk_destruct+0x68/0x8c
  [<10d8e3dc>] __sk_free+0x7c/0x148
  [<10d8e560>] sk_free+0xb8/0xf0
  [<10f6420c>] unix_release_sock+0x3ac/0x50c
  [<10f643b8>] unix_release+0x4c/0x7c
  [<10d832f8>] __sock_release+0x5c/0xf8
  [<10d833b4>] sock_close+0x20/0x44
  [<107ba52c>] __fput+0xf8/0x468
  [<107baa08>] __fput_sync+0xb4/0xd4
  [<107b471c>] sys_close+0x44/0x94
  [<10405334>] syscall_exit+0x0/0x10

Bisecting points to this commit which triggers the issue:
	commit  417c564
	Author: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
	Date:   Fri Aug 16 17:43:07 2024 +0200
	        lsm: replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls

After more analysis it seems that we don't fully implement the static calls
and jump tables yet. Additionally the functions which mark kernel memory
read-only or read-write-executable needs to be further enhanced to be able to
fully support static calls.

Enabling CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y was one possibility to trigger the issue,
although YAMA isn't the reason for the fault.

As a temporary solution disable JUMP_LABEL functionality to
avoid the crashes.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.12+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit b0fce54 upstream.

syz reports an out of bounds read:

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ocfs2_match fs/ocfs2/dir.c:334
[inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ocfs2_search_dirblock+0x283/0x6e0
fs/ocfs2/dir.c:367
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88804d8b9982 by task syz-executor.2/14802

CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 14802 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4 ChimeraOS#2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1
04/01/2014
Sched_ext: serialise (enabled+all), task: runnable_at=-10ms
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x229/0x350 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0x164/0x530 mm/kasan/report.c:489
kasan_report+0x147/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:602
ocfs2_match fs/ocfs2/dir.c:334 [inline]
ocfs2_search_dirblock+0x283/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:367
ocfs2_find_entry_id fs/ocfs2/dir.c:414 [inline]
ocfs2_find_entry+0x1143/0x2db0 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1078
ocfs2_find_files_on_disk+0x18e/0x530 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1981
ocfs2_lookup_ino_from_name+0xb6/0x110 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:2003
ocfs2_lookup+0x30a/0xd40 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:122
lookup_open fs/namei.c:3627 [inline]
open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3748 [inline]
path_openat+0x145a/0x3870 fs/namei.c:3984
do_filp_open+0xe9/0x1c0 fs/namei.c:4014
do_sys_openat2+0x135/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1402
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1417 [inline]
__do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1433 [inline]
__se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1428 [inline]
__x64_sys_openat+0x15d/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1428
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x210 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f01076903ad
Code: c3 e8 a7 2b 00 00 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89
f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01
f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f01084acfc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f01077cbf80 RCX: 00007f01076903ad
RDX: 0000000000105042 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: ffffffffffffff9c
RBP: 00007f01077cbf80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000000001ff R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f01077cbf80 R14: 00007f010764fc90 R15: 00007f010848d000
</TASK>
==================================================================

And a general protection fault in ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert:

==================================================================
loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 32768
JBD2: Ignoring recovery information on journal
ocfs2: Mounting device (7,0) on (node local, slot 0) with ordered data
mode.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [ChimeraOS#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5096 Comm: syz-executor792 Not tainted
6.11.0-rc4-syzkaller-00002-gb0da640826ba #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS
1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ocfs2_find_dir_space_id fs/ocfs2/dir.c:3406 [inline]
RIP: 0010:ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert+0x3309/0x5c70 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:4280
Code: 00 00 e8 2a 25 13 fe e9 ba 06 00 00 e8 20 25 13 fe e9 4f 01 00 00
e8 16 25 13 fe 49 8d 7f 08 49 8d 5f 09 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6
04 20 84 c0 0f 85 bd 23 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 0f
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000af9f020 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff88801e27a440
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000400 RDI: 0000000000000008
RBP: ffffc9000af9f830 R08: ffffffff8380395b R09: ffffffff838090a7
R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff88801e27a440 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffff88803c660878 R14: f700000000000088 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  000055555a677380(0000) GS:ffff888020800000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000560bce569178 CR3: 000000001de5a000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ocfs2_mknod+0xcaf/0x2b40 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:292
vfs_mknod+0x36d/0x3b0 fs/namei.c:4088
do_mknodat+0x3ec/0x5b0
__do_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4166 [inline]
__se_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4163 [inline]
__x64_sys_mknodat+0xa7/0xc0 fs/namei.c:4163
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f2dafda3a99
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 17 00 00 90 48 89
f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08
0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8
64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffe336a6658 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
0000000000000103
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX:
00007f2dafda3a99
RDX: 00000000000021c0 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI:
00000000ffffff9c
RBP: 00007f2dafe1b5f0 R08: 0000000000004480 R09:
000055555a6784c0
R10: 0000000000000103 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:
00007ffe336a6680
R13: 00007ffe336a68a8 R14: 431bde82d7b634db R15:
00007f2dafdec03b
</TASK>
==================================================================

The two reports are all caused invalid negative i_size of dir inode.  For
ocfs2, dir_inode can't be negative or zero.

Here add a check in which is called by ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry().  It
fixes the second report as ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry() must be called
before ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert().  Also set a up limit for dir with
OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL.  The i_size can't be great than blocksize.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250106140640.92260-1-glass.su@suse.com
Reported-by: Jiacheng Xu <stitch@zju.edu.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ocfs2-devel/17a04f01.1ae74.19436d003fc.Coremail.stitch@zju.edu.cn/T/#u
Reported-by: syzbot+5a64828fcc4c2ad9b04f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0000000000005894f3062018caf1@google.com/T/
Signed-off-by: Su Yue <glass.su@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

We have several places across the kernel where we want to access another
task's syscall arguments, such as ptrace(2), seccomp(2), etc., by making
a call to syscall_get_arguments().

This works for register arguments right away by accessing the task's
`regs' member of `struct pt_regs', however for stack arguments seen with
32-bit/o32 kernels things are more complicated.  Technically they ought
to be obtained from the user stack with calls to an access_remote_vm(),
but we have an easier way available already.

So as to be able to access syscall stack arguments as regular function
arguments following the MIPS calling convention we copy them over from
the user stack to the kernel stack in arch/mips/kernel/scall32-o32.S, in
handle_sys(), to the current stack frame's outgoing argument space at
the top of the stack, which is where the handler called expects to see
its incoming arguments.  This area is also pointed at by the `pt_regs'
pointer obtained by task_pt_regs().

Make the o32 stack argument space a proper member of `struct pt_regs'
then, by renaming the existing member from `pad0' to `args' and using
generated offsets to access the space.  No functional change though.

With the change in place the o32 kernel stack frame layout at the entry
to a syscall handler invoked by handle_sys() is therefore as follows:

$sp + 68 -> |         ...         | <- pt_regs.regs[9]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 64 -> |         $t0         | <- pt_regs.regs[8]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 60 -> |   $a3/argument ChimeraOS#4   | <- pt_regs.regs[7]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 56 -> |   $a2/argument ChimeraOS#3   | <- pt_regs.regs[6]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 52 -> |   $a1/argument ChimeraOS#2   | <- pt_regs.regs[5]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 48 -> |   $a0/argument ChimeraOS#1   | <- pt_regs.regs[4]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 44 -> |         $v1         | <- pt_regs.regs[3]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 40 -> |         $v0         | <- pt_regs.regs[2]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 36 -> |         $at         | <- pt_regs.regs[1]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 32 -> |        $zero        | <- pt_regs.regs[0]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 28 -> |  stack argument ChimeraOS#8  | <- pt_regs.args[7]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 24 -> |  stack argument ChimeraOS#7  | <- pt_regs.args[6]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 20 -> |  stack argument ChimeraOS#6  | <- pt_regs.args[5]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 16 -> |  stack argument ChimeraOS#5  | <- pt_regs.args[4]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 12 -> | psABI space for $a3 | <- pt_regs.args[3]
            +---------------------+
$sp +  8 -> | psABI space for $a2 | <- pt_regs.args[2]
            +---------------------+
$sp +  4 -> | psABI space for $a1 | <- pt_regs.args[1]
            +---------------------+
$sp +  0 -> | psABI space for $a0 | <- pt_regs.args[0]
            +---------------------+

holding user data received and with the first 4 frame slots reserved by
the psABI for the compiler to spill the incoming arguments from $a0-$a3
registers (which it sometimes does according to its needs) and the next
4 frame slots designated by the psABI for any stack function arguments
that follow.  This data is also available for other tasks to peek/poke
at as reqired and where permitted.

Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>

…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.14, take ChimeraOS#2

- Large set of fixes for vector handling, specially in the interactions
  between host and guest state. This fixes a number of bugs affecting
  actual deployments, and greatly simplifies the FP/SIMD/SVE handling.
  Thanks to Mark Rutland for dealing with this thankless task.

- Fix an ugly race between vcpu and vgic creation/init, resulting in
  unexpected behaviours.

- Fix use of kernel VAs at EL2 when emulating timers with nVHE.

- Small set of pKVM improvements and cleanups.

[ Upstream commit a216542 ]

When COWing a relocation tree path, at relocation.c:replace_path(), we
can trigger a lockdep splat while we are in the btrfs_search_slot() call
against the relocation root. This happens in that callchain at
ctree.c:read_block_for_search() when we happen to find a child extent
buffer already loaded through the fs tree with a lockdep class set to
the fs tree. So when we attempt to lock that extent buffer through a
relocation tree we have to reset the lockdep class to the class for a
relocation tree, since a relocation tree has extent buffers that used
to belong to a fs tree and may currently be already loaded (we swap
extent buffers between the two trees at the end of replace_path()).

However we are missing calls to btrfs_maybe_reset_lockdep_class() to reset
the lockdep class at ctree.c:read_block_for_search() before we read lock
an extent buffer, just like we did for btrfs_search_slot() in commit
b40130b ("btrfs: fix lockdep splat with reloc root extent buffers").

So add the missing btrfs_maybe_reset_lockdep_class() calls before the
attempts to read lock an extent buffer at ctree.c:read_block_for_search().

The lockdep splat was reported by syzbot and it looks like this:

   ======================================================
   WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
   6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00163-gab75170520d4 #0 Not tainted
   ------------------------------------------------------
   syz.0.0/5335 is trying to acquire lock:
   ffff8880545dbc38 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146

   but task is already holding lock:
   ffff8880545dba58 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189

   which lock already depends on the new lock.

   the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

   -> ChimeraOS#2 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}:
          reacquire_held_locks+0x3eb/0x690 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5374
          __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5563 [inline]
          lock_release+0x396/0xa30 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5870
          up_write+0x79/0x590 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1629
          btrfs_force_cow_block+0x14b3/0x1fd0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:660
          btrfs_cow_block+0x371/0x830 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:755
          btrfs_search_slot+0xc01/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2153
          replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224
          merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692
          merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942
          relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754
          btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087
          btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494
          __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278
          btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655
          btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670
          vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
          __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
          __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892
          do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
          do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
          entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

   -> ChimeraOS#1 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{4:4}:
          lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849
          down_write_nested+0xa2/0x220 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1693
          btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189
          btrfs_init_new_buffer fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:5052 [inline]
          btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x41c/0x1440 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:5132
          btrfs_force_cow_block+0x526/0x1fd0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:573
          btrfs_cow_block+0x371/0x830 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:755
          btrfs_search_slot+0xc01/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2153
          btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x9c/0x1a0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4351
          btrfs_insert_empty_item fs/btrfs/ctree.h:688 [inline]
          btrfs_insert_inode_ref+0x2bb/0xf80 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:330
          btrfs_rename_exchange fs/btrfs/inode.c:7990 [inline]
          btrfs_rename2+0xcb7/0x2b90 fs/btrfs/inode.c:8374
          vfs_rename+0xbdb/0xf00 fs/namei.c:5067
          do_renameat2+0xd94/0x13f0 fs/namei.c:5224
          __do_sys_renameat2 fs/namei.c:5258 [inline]
          __se_sys_renameat2 fs/namei.c:5255 [inline]
          __x64_sys_renameat2+0xce/0xe0 fs/namei.c:5255
          do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
          do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
          entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

   -> #0 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{4:4}:
          check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline]
          check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline]
          validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904
          __lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226
          lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849
          down_read_nested+0xb5/0xa50 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1649
          btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146
          btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.h:188 [inline]
          read_block_for_search+0x718/0xbb0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1610
          btrfs_search_slot+0x1274/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2237
          replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224
          merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692
          merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942
          relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754
          btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087
          btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494
          __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278
          btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655
          btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670
          vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
          __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
          __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892
          do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
          do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
          entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

   other info that might help us debug this:

   Chain exists of:
     btrfs-tree-01 --> btrfs-tree-01/1 --> btrfs-treloc-02/1

    Possible unsafe locking scenario:

          CPU0                    CPU1
          ----                    ----
     lock(btrfs-treloc-02/1);
                                  lock(btrfs-tree-01/1);
                                  lock(btrfs-treloc-02/1);
     rlock(btrfs-tree-01);

    *** DEADLOCK ***

   8 locks held by syz.0.0/5335:
    #0: ffff88801e3ae420 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write_file+0x5e/0x200 fs/namespace.c:559
    ChimeraOS#1: ffff888052c760d0 (&fs_info->reclaim_bgs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __btrfs_balance+0x4c2/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4183
    ChimeraOS#2: ffff888052c74850 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x775/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4086
    ChimeraOS#3: ffff88801e3ae610 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: merge_reloc_root+0xf11/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1659
    ChimeraOS#4: ffff888052c76470 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x405/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288
    ChimeraOS#5: ffff888052c76498 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x405/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288
    ChimeraOS#6: ffff8880545db878 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189
    ChimeraOS#7: ffff8880545dba58 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189

   stack backtrace:
   CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5335 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00163-gab75170520d4 #0
   Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
   Call Trace:
    <TASK>
    __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
    dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
    print_circular_bug+0x13a/0x1b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2074
    check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2206
    check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline]
    check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline]
    validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904
    __lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226
    lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849
    down_read_nested+0xb5/0xa50 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1649
    btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146
    btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.h:188 [inline]
    read_block_for_search+0x718/0xbb0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1610
    btrfs_search_slot+0x1274/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2237
    replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224
    merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692
    merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942
    relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754
    btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087
    btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494
    __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278
    btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655
    btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670
    vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
    __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
    __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892
    do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
    do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
   RIP: 0033:0x7f1ac6985d29
   Code: ff ff c3 (...)
   RSP: 002b:00007f1ac63fe038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
   RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1ac6b76160 RCX: 00007f1ac6985d29
   RDX: 0000000020000180 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000007
   RBP: 00007f1ac6a01b08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
   R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
   R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 00007f1ac6b76160 R15: 00007fffda145a88
    </TASK>

Reported-by: syzbot+63913e558c084f7f8fdc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/677b3014.050a0220.3b53b0.0064.GAE@google.com/
Fixes: 9978599 ("btrfs: reduce lock contention when eb cache miss for btree search")
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 3599bae upstream.

The 32-bit Debian kernel 6.12 fails to boot and crashes like this:

 init (pid 65): Protection id trap (code 7)
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 65 Comm: init Not tainted 6.12.9 ChimeraOS#2
 Hardware name: 9000/778/B160L

      YZrvWESTHLNXBCVMcbcbcbcbOGFRQPDI
 PSW: 00000000000001000000000000001111 Not tainted
 r00-03  0004000f 110d39d0 109a6558 12974400
 r04-07  12a810e0 12a810e0 00000000 12a81144
 r08-11  12a81174 00000007 00000000 00000002
 r12-15  f8c55c08 0000006c 00000001 f8c55c08
 r16-19  00000002 f8c58620 002da3a8 0000004e
 r20-23  00001a46 0000000f 10754f84 00000000
 r24-27  00000000 00000003 12ae6980 1127b9d0
 r28-31  00000000 00000000 12974440 109a6558
 sr00-03  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000010
 sr04-07  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000

 IASQ: 00000000 00000000 IAOQ: 110d39d0 110d39d4
  IIR: baadf00d    ISR: 00000000  IOR: 110d39d0
  CPU:        0   CR30: 128740c0 CR31: 00000000
  ORIG_R28: 000003f3
  IAOQ[0]: 0x110d39d0
  IAOQ[1]: 0x110d39d4
  RP(r2): security_sk_free+0x70/0x1a4
 Backtrace:
  [<10d8c844>] __sk_destruct+0x2bc/0x378
  [<10d8e33c>] sk_destruct+0x68/0x8c
  [<10d8e3dc>] __sk_free+0x7c/0x148
  [<10d8e560>] sk_free+0xb8/0xf0
  [<10f6420c>] unix_release_sock+0x3ac/0x50c
  [<10f643b8>] unix_release+0x4c/0x7c
  [<10d832f8>] __sock_release+0x5c/0xf8
  [<10d833b4>] sock_close+0x20/0x44
  [<107ba52c>] __fput+0xf8/0x468
  [<107baa08>] __fput_sync+0xb4/0xd4
  [<107b471c>] sys_close+0x44/0x94
  [<10405334>] syscall_exit+0x0/0x10

Bisecting points to this commit which triggers the issue:
	commit  417c564
	Author: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
	Date:   Fri Aug 16 17:43:07 2024 +0200
	        lsm: replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls

After more analysis it seems that we don't fully implement the static calls
and jump tables yet. Additionally the functions which mark kernel memory
read-only or read-write-executable needs to be further enhanced to be able to
fully support static calls.

Enabling CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y was one possibility to trigger the issue,
although YAMA isn't the reason for the fault.

As a temporary solution disable JUMP_LABEL functionality to
avoid the crashes.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.12+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…ea as VM_ALLOC

Erhard reported the following KASAN hit while booting his PowerMac G4
with a KASAN-enabled kernel 6.13-rc6:

  BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in copy_to_kernel_nofault+0xd8/0x1c8
  Write of size 8 at addr f1000000 by task chronyd/1293

  CPU: 0 UID: 123 PID: 1293 Comm: chronyd Tainted: G        W          6.13.0-rc6-PMacG4 ChimeraOS#2
  Tainted: [W]=WARN
  Hardware name: PowerMac3,6 7455 0x80010303 PowerMac
  Call Trace:
  [c2437590] [c1631a84] dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0x8c (unreliable)
  [c24375b0] [c0504998] print_report+0xdc/0x504
  [c2437610] [c050475c] kasan_report+0xf8/0x108
  [c2437690] [c0505a3c] kasan_check_range+0x24/0x18c
  [c24376a0] [c03fb5e4] copy_to_kernel_nofault+0xd8/0x1c8
  [c24376c0] [c004c014] patch_instructions+0x15c/0x16c
  [c2437710] [c00731a8] bpf_arch_text_copy+0x60/0x7c
  [c2437730] [c0281168] bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize+0x50/0xac
  [c2437750] [c0073cf4] bpf_int_jit_compile+0xb30/0xdec
  [c2437880] [c0280394] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x15c/0x478
  [c24378d0] [c1263428] bpf_prepare_filter+0xbf8/0xc14
  [c2437990] [c12677ec] bpf_prog_create_from_user+0x258/0x2b4
  [c24379d0] [c027111c] do_seccomp+0x3dc/0x1890
  [c2437ac0] [c001d8e0] system_call_exception+0x2dc/0x420
  [c2437f30] [c00281ac] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x2c
  --- interrupt: c00 at 0x5a1274
  NIP:  005a1274 LR: 006a3b3c CTR: 005296c8
  REGS: c2437f40 TRAP: 0c00   Tainted: G        W           (6.13.0-rc6-PMacG4)
  MSR:  0200f932 <VEC,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI>  CR: 24004422  XER: 00000000

  GPR00: 00000166 af8f3fa0 a7ee3540 00000001 00000000 013b6500 005a5858 0200f932
  GPR08: 00000000 00001fe9 013d5fc8 005296c8 2822244c 00b2fcd8 00000000 af8f4b57
  GPR16: 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000002
  GPR24: 00afdbb0 00000000 00000000 00000000 006e0004 013ce060 006e7c1c 00000001
  NIP [005a1274] 0x5a1274
  LR [006a3b3c] 0x6a3b3c
  --- interrupt: c00

  The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at
   [f1000000, f1002000) created by:
   text_area_cpu_up+0x20/0x190

  The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
  page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x76e30
  flags: 0x80000000(zone=2)
  raw: 80000000 00000000 00000122 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff 00000001
  raw: 00000000
  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

  Memory state around the buggy address:
   f0ffff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
   f0ffff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  >f1000000: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
             ^
   f1000080: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
   f1000100: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
  ==================================================================

f8 corresponds to KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID which means the area is not
initialised hence not supposed to be used yet.

Powerpc text patching infrastructure allocates a virtual memory area
using get_vm_area() and flags it as VM_ALLOC. But that flag is meant
to be used for vmalloc() and vmalloc() allocated memory is not
supposed to be used before a call to __vmalloc_node_range() which is
never called for that area.

That went undetected until commit e4137f0 ("mm, kasan, kmsan:
instrument copy_from/to_kernel_nofault")

The area allocated by text_area_cpu_up() is not vmalloc memory, it is
mapped directly on demand when needed by map_kernel_page(). There is
no VM flag corresponding to such usage, so just pass no flag. That way
the area will be unpoisonned and usable immediately.

Reported-by: Erhard Furtner <erhard_f@mailbox.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250112135832.57c92322@yea/
Fixes: 37bc3e5 ("powerpc/lib/code-patching: Use alternate map for patch_instruction()")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/06621423da339b374f48c0886e3a5db18e896be8.1739342693.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu

[ Upstream commit e4b6b66 ]

When using touchscreen and framebuffer, Nokia 770 crashes easily with:

    BUG: scheduling while atomic: irq/144-ads7846/82/0x00010000
    Modules linked in: usb_f_ecm g_ether usb_f_rndis u_ether libcomposite configfs omap_udc ohci_omap ohci_hcd
    CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 82 Comm: irq/144-ads7846 Not tainted 6.12.7-770 ChimeraOS#2
    Hardware name: Nokia 770
    Call trace:
     unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14
     show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x5c
     dump_stack_lvl from __schedule_bug+0x50/0x70
     __schedule_bug from __schedule+0x4d4/0x5bc
     __schedule from schedule+0x34/0xa0
     schedule from schedule_preempt_disabled+0xc/0x10
     schedule_preempt_disabled from __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x218/0x3b4
     __mutex_lock.constprop.0 from clk_prepare_lock+0x38/0xe4
     clk_prepare_lock from clk_set_rate+0x18/0x154
     clk_set_rate from sossi_read_data+0x4c/0x168
     sossi_read_data from hwa742_read_reg+0x5c/0x8c
     hwa742_read_reg from send_frame_handler+0xfc/0x300
     send_frame_handler from process_pending_requests+0x74/0xd0
     process_pending_requests from lcd_dma_irq_handler+0x50/0x74
     lcd_dma_irq_handler from __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x44/0x130
     __handle_irq_event_percpu from handle_irq_event+0x28/0x68
     handle_irq_event from handle_level_irq+0x9c/0x170
     handle_level_irq from generic_handle_domain_irq+0x2c/0x3c
     generic_handle_domain_irq from omap1_handle_irq+0x40/0x8c
     omap1_handle_irq from generic_handle_arch_irq+0x28/0x3c
     generic_handle_arch_irq from call_with_stack+0x1c/0x24
     call_with_stack from __irq_svc+0x94/0xa8
    Exception stack(0xc5255da0 to 0xc5255de8)
    5da0: 00000001 c22fc620 00000000 00000000 c08384a8 c106fc00 00000000 c240c248
    5dc0: c113a600 c3f6ec30 00000001 00000000 c22fc620 c5255df0 c22fc620 c0279a94
    5de0: 60000013 ffffffff
     __irq_svc from clk_prepare_lock+0x4c/0xe4
     clk_prepare_lock from clk_get_rate+0x10/0x74
     clk_get_rate from uwire_setup_transfer+0x40/0x180
     uwire_setup_transfer from spi_bitbang_transfer_one+0x2c/0x9c
     spi_bitbang_transfer_one from spi_transfer_one_message+0x2d0/0x664
     spi_transfer_one_message from __spi_pump_transfer_message+0x29c/0x498
     __spi_pump_transfer_message from __spi_sync+0x1f8/0x2e8
     __spi_sync from spi_sync+0x24/0x40
     spi_sync from ads7846_halfd_read_state+0x5c/0x1c0
     ads7846_halfd_read_state from ads7846_irq+0x58/0x348
     ads7846_irq from irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x78
     irq_thread_fn from irq_thread+0x120/0x228
     irq_thread from kthread+0xc8/0xe8
     kthread from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28

As a quick fix, switch to a threaded IRQ which provides a stable system.

Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 6d00234 ]

Function xen_pin_page calls xen_pte_lock, which in turn grab page
table lock (ptlock). When locking, xen_pte_lock expect mm->page_table_lock
to be held before grabbing ptlock, but this does not happen when pinning
is caused by xen_mm_pin_all.

This commit addresses lockdep warning below, which shows up when
suspending a Xen VM.

[ 3680.658422] Freezing user space processes
[ 3680.660156] Freezing user space processes completed (elapsed 0.001 seconds)
[ 3680.660182] OOM killer disabled.
[ 3680.660192] Freezing remaining freezable tasks
[ 3680.661485] Freezing remaining freezable tasks completed (elapsed 0.001 seconds)
[ 3680.685254]
[ 3680.685265] ==================================
[ 3680.685269] WARNING: Nested lock was not taken
[ 3680.685274] 6.12.0+ ChimeraOS#16 Tainted: G        W
[ 3680.685279] ----------------------------------
[ 3680.685283] migration/0/19 is trying to lock:
[ 3680.685288] ffff88800bac33c0 (ptlock_ptr(ptdesc)ChimeraOS#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0
[ 3680.685303]
[ 3680.685303] but this task is not holding:
[ 3680.685308] init_mm.page_table_lock
[ 3680.685311]
[ 3680.685311] stack backtrace:
[ 3680.685316] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 19 Comm: migration/0 Tainted: G        W          6.12.0+ ChimeraOS#16
[ 3680.685324] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ 3680.685328] Stopper: multi_cpu_stop+0x0/0x120 <- __stop_cpus.constprop.0+0x8c/0xd0
[ 3680.685339] Call Trace:
[ 3680.685344]  <TASK>
[ 3680.685347]  dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0
[ 3680.685356]  __lock_acquire+0x917/0x2310
[ 3680.685364]  lock_acquire+0xce/0x2c0
[ 3680.685369]  ? xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0
[ 3680.685373]  _raw_spin_lock_nest_lock+0x2f/0x70
[ 3680.685381]  ? xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0
[ 3680.685386]  xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0
[ 3680.685390]  ? __pfx_xen_pin_page+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685394]  __xen_pgd_walk+0x233/0x2c0
[ 3680.685401]  ? stop_one_cpu+0x91/0x100
[ 3680.685405]  __xen_pgd_pin+0x5d/0x250
[ 3680.685410]  xen_mm_pin_all+0x70/0xa0
[ 3680.685415]  xen_pv_pre_suspend+0xf/0x280
[ 3680.685420]  xen_suspend+0x57/0x1a0
[ 3680.685428]  multi_cpu_stop+0x6b/0x120
[ 3680.685432]  ? update_cpumasks_hier+0x7c/0xa60
[ 3680.685439]  ? __pfx_multi_cpu_stop+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685443]  cpu_stopper_thread+0x8c/0x140
[ 3680.685448]  ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x20/0x1f0
[ 3680.685454]  ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685458]  smpboot_thread_fn+0xed/0x1f0
[ 3680.685462]  kthread+0xde/0x110
[ 3680.685467]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685471]  ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50
[ 3680.685478]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685482]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 3680.685489]  </TASK>
[ 3680.685491]
[ 3680.685491] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 3680.685497] 1 lock held by migration/0/19:
[ 3680.685500]  #0: ffffffff8284df38 (pgd_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: xen_mm_pin_all+0x14/0xa0
[ 3680.685512]
[ 3680.685512] stack backtrace:
[ 3680.685518] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 19 Comm: migration/0 Tainted: G        W          6.12.0+ ChimeraOS#16
[ 3680.685528] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ 3680.685531] Stopper: multi_cpu_stop+0x0/0x120 <- __stop_cpus.constprop.0+0x8c/0xd0
[ 3680.685538] Call Trace:
[ 3680.685541]  <TASK>
[ 3680.685544]  dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0
[ 3680.685549]  __lock_acquire+0x93c/0x2310
[ 3680.685554]  lock_acquire+0xce/0x2c0
[ 3680.685558]  ? xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0
[ 3680.685562]  _raw_spin_lock_nest_lock+0x2f/0x70
[ 3680.685568]  ? xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0
[ 3680.685572]  xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0
[ 3680.685578]  ? __pfx_xen_pin_page+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685582]  __xen_pgd_walk+0x233/0x2c0
[ 3680.685588]  ? stop_one_cpu+0x91/0x100
[ 3680.685592]  __xen_pgd_pin+0x5d/0x250
[ 3680.685596]  xen_mm_pin_all+0x70/0xa0
[ 3680.685600]  xen_pv_pre_suspend+0xf/0x280
[ 3680.685607]  xen_suspend+0x57/0x1a0
[ 3680.685611]  multi_cpu_stop+0x6b/0x120
[ 3680.685615]  ? update_cpumasks_hier+0x7c/0xa60
[ 3680.685620]  ? __pfx_multi_cpu_stop+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685625]  cpu_stopper_thread+0x8c/0x140
[ 3680.685629]  ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x20/0x1f0
[ 3680.685634]  ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685638]  smpboot_thread_fn+0xed/0x1f0
[ 3680.685642]  kthread+0xde/0x110
[ 3680.685645]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685649]  ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50
[ 3680.685654]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685657]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 3680.685662]  </TASK>
[ 3680.685267] xen:grant_table: Grant tables using version 1 layout
[ 3680.685921] OOM killer enabled.
[ 3680.685934] Restarting tasks ... done.

Signed-off-by: Maksym Planeta <maksym@exostellar.io>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Message-ID: <20241204103516.3309112-1-maksym@exostellar.io>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Since commit 6037802 ("power: supply: core: implement extension API")
there is the following ABBA deadlock (simplified) between the LED trigger
code and the power-supply code:

1) When registering a power-supply class device, power_supply_register()
calls led_trigger_register() from power_supply_create_triggers() in
a scoped_guard(rwsem_read, &psy->extensions_sem) context.
led_trigger_register() then in turn takes a LED subsystem lock.
So here we have the following locking order:

* Read-lock extensions_sem
* Lock LED subsystem lock(s)

2) When registering a LED class device, with its default trigger set
to a power-supply LED trigger (which has already been registered)
The LED class code calls power_supply_led_trigger_activate() when
setting up the default trigger. power_supply_led_trigger_activate()
calls power_supply_get_property() to determine the initial value of
to assign to the LED and that read-locks extensions_sem. So now we
have the following locking order:

* Lock LED subsystem lock(s)
* Read-lock extensions_sem

Fixing this is easy, there is no need to hold the extensions_sem when
calling power_supply_create_triggers() since all triggers are always
created rather then checking for the presence of certain attributes as
power_supply_add_hwmon_sysfs() does. Move power_supply_create_triggers()
out of the guard block to fix this.

Here is the lockdep report fixed by this change:

[   31.249343] ======================================================
[   31.249378] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[   31.249413] 6.13.0-rc6+ torvalds#251 Tainted: G         C  E
[   31.249440] ------------------------------------------------------
[   31.249471] (udev-worker)/553 is trying to acquire lock:
[   31.249501] ffff892adbcaf660 (&psy->extensions_sem){.+.+}-{4:4}, at: power_supply_get_property.part.0+0x22/0x150
[   31.249574]
               but task is already holding lock:
[   31.249603] ffff892adbc0bad0 (&led_cdev->trigger_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: led_trigger_set_default+0x34/0xe0
[   31.249657]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[   31.249696]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[   31.249735]
               -> ChimeraOS#2 (&led_cdev->trigger_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
[   31.249778]        down_write+0x3b/0xd0
[   31.249803]        led_trigger_set_default+0x34/0xe0
[   31.249833]        led_classdev_register_ext+0x311/0x3a0
[   31.249863]        input_leds_connect+0x1dc/0x2a0
[   31.249889]        input_attach_handler.isra.0+0x75/0x90
[   31.249921]        input_register_device.cold+0xa1/0x150
[   31.249955]        hidinput_connect+0x8a2/0xb80
[   31.249982]        hid_connect+0x582/0x5c0
[   31.250007]        hid_hw_start+0x3f/0x60
[   31.250030]        hid_device_probe+0x122/0x1f0
[   31.250053]        really_probe+0xde/0x340
[   31.250080]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110
[   31.250105]        driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0
[   31.250132]        __device_attach_driver+0x85/0x110
[   31.250160]        bus_for_each_drv+0x78/0xc0
[   31.250184]        __device_attach+0xb0/0x1b0
[   31.250207]        bus_probe_device+0x94/0xb0
[   31.250230]        device_add+0x64a/0x860
[   31.250252]        hid_add_device+0xe5/0x240
[   31.250279]        usbhid_probe+0x4dc/0x620
[   31.250303]        usb_probe_interface+0xe4/0x2a0
[   31.250329]        really_probe+0xde/0x340
[   31.250353]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110
[   31.250377]        driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0
[   31.250404]        __device_attach_driver+0x85/0x110
[   31.250431]        bus_for_each_drv+0x78/0xc0
[   31.250455]        __device_attach+0xb0/0x1b0
[   31.250478]        bus_probe_device+0x94/0xb0
[   31.250501]        device_add+0x64a/0x860
[   31.250523]        usb_set_configuration+0x606/0x8a0
[   31.250552]        usb_generic_driver_probe+0x3e/0x60
[   31.250579]        usb_probe_device+0x3d/0x120
[   31.250605]        really_probe+0xde/0x340
[   31.250629]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110
[   31.250653]        driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0
[   31.250680]        __device_attach_driver+0x85/0x110
[   31.250707]        bus_for_each_drv+0x78/0xc0
[   31.250731]        __device_attach+0xb0/0x1b0
[   31.250753]        bus_probe_device+0x94/0xb0
[   31.250776]        device_add+0x64a/0x860
[   31.250798]        usb_new_device.cold+0x141/0x38f
[   31.250828]        hub_event+0x1166/0x1980
[   31.250854]        process_one_work+0x20f/0x580
[   31.250879]        worker_thread+0x1d1/0x3b0
[   31.250904]        kthread+0xee/0x120
[   31.250926]        ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50
[   31.250954]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[   31.250982]
               -> ChimeraOS#1 (triggers_list_lock){++++}-{4:4}:
[   31.251022]        down_write+0x3b/0xd0
[   31.251045]        led_trigger_register+0x40/0x1b0
[   31.251074]        power_supply_register_led_trigger+0x88/0x150
[   31.251107]        power_supply_create_triggers+0x55/0xe0
[   31.251135]        __power_supply_register.part.0+0x34e/0x4a0
[   31.251164]        devm_power_supply_register+0x70/0xc0
[   31.251190]        bq27xxx_battery_setup+0x1a1/0x6d0 [bq27xxx_battery]
[   31.251235]        bq27xxx_battery_i2c_probe+0xe5/0x17f [bq27xxx_battery_i2c]
[   31.251272]        i2c_device_probe+0x125/0x2b0
[   31.251299]        really_probe+0xde/0x340
[   31.251324]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110
[   31.251348]        driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0
[   31.251375]        __driver_attach+0xba/0x1c0
[   31.251398]        bus_for_each_dev+0x6b/0xb0
[   31.251421]        bus_add_driver+0x111/0x1f0
[   31.251445]        driver_register+0x6e/0xc0
[   31.251470]        i2c_register_driver+0x41/0xb0
[   31.251498]        do_one_initcall+0x5e/0x3a0
[   31.251522]        do_init_module+0x60/0x220
[   31.251550]        __do_sys_init_module+0x15f/0x190
[   31.251575]        do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
[   31.251598]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[   31.251629]
               -> #0 (&psy->extensions_sem){.+.+}-{4:4}:
[   31.251668]        __lock_acquire+0x13ce/0x21c0
[   31.251694]        lock_acquire+0xcf/0x2e0
[   31.251719]        down_read+0x3e/0x170
[   31.251741]        power_supply_get_property.part.0+0x22/0x150
[   31.251774]        power_supply_update_leds+0x8d/0x230
[   31.251804]        power_supply_led_trigger_activate+0x18/0x20
[   31.251837]        led_trigger_set+0x1fc/0x300
[   31.251863]        led_trigger_set_default+0x90/0xe0
[   31.251892]        led_classdev_register_ext+0x311/0x3a0
[   31.251921]        devm_led_classdev_multicolor_register_ext+0x6e/0xb80 [led_class_multicolor]
[   31.251969]        ktd202x_probe+0x464/0x5c0 [leds_ktd202x]
[   31.252002]        i2c_device_probe+0x125/0x2b0
[   31.252027]        really_probe+0xde/0x340
[   31.252052]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110
[   31.252076]        driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0
[   31.252103]        __driver_attach+0xba/0x1c0
[   31.252125]        bus_for_each_dev+0x6b/0xb0
[   31.252148]        bus_add_driver+0x111/0x1f0
[   31.252172]        driver_register+0x6e/0xc0
[   31.252197]        i2c_register_driver+0x41/0xb0
[   31.252225]        do_one_initcall+0x5e/0x3a0
[   31.252248]        do_init_module+0x60/0x220
[   31.252274]        __do_sys_init_module+0x15f/0x190
[   31.253986]        do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
[   31.255826]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[   31.257614]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[   31.257619] Chain exists of:
                 &psy->extensions_sem --> triggers_list_lock --> &led_cdev->trigger_lock

[   31.257630]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[   31.257632]        CPU0                    CPU1
[   31.257633]        ----                    ----
[   31.257634]   lock(&led_cdev->trigger_lock);
[   31.257637]                                lock(triggers_list_lock);
[   31.257640]                                lock(&led_cdev->trigger_lock);
[   31.257643]   rlock(&psy->extensions_sem);
[   31.257646]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[   31.289433] 4 locks held by (udev-worker)/553:
[   31.289443]  #0: ffff892ad9658108 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __driver_attach+0xaf/0x1c0
[   31.289463]  ChimeraOS#1: ffff892adbc0bbc8 (&led_cdev->led_access){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: led_classdev_register_ext+0x1c7/0x3a0
[   31.289476]  ChimeraOS#2: ffffffffad0e30b0 (triggers_list_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: led_trigger_set_default+0x2c/0xe0
[   31.289487]  ChimeraOS#3: ffff892adbc0bad0 (&led_cdev->trigger_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: led_trigger_set_default+0x34/0xe0

Fixes: 6037802 ("power: supply: core: implement extension API")
Cc: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Cc: Armin Wolf <W_Armin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250130140035.20636-1-hdegoede@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>

…ea as VM_ALLOC

[ Upstream commit d262a19 ]

Erhard reported the following KASAN hit while booting his PowerMac G4
with a KASAN-enabled kernel 6.13-rc6:

  BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in copy_to_kernel_nofault+0xd8/0x1c8
  Write of size 8 at addr f1000000 by task chronyd/1293

  CPU: 0 UID: 123 PID: 1293 Comm: chronyd Tainted: G        W          6.13.0-rc6-PMacG4 #2
  Tainted: [W]=WARN
  Hardware name: PowerMac3,6 7455 0x80010303 PowerMac
  Call Trace:
  [c2437590] [c1631a84] dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0x8c (unreliable)
  [c24375b0] [c0504998] print_report+0xdc/0x504
  [c2437610] [c050475c] kasan_report+0xf8/0x108
  [c2437690] [c0505a3c] kasan_check_range+0x24/0x18c
  [c24376a0] [c03fb5e4] copy_to_kernel_nofault+0xd8/0x1c8
  [c24376c0] [c004c014] patch_instructions+0x15c/0x16c
  [c2437710] [c00731a8] bpf_arch_text_copy+0x60/0x7c
  [c2437730] [c0281168] bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize+0x50/0xac
  [c2437750] [c0073cf4] bpf_int_jit_compile+0xb30/0xdec
  [c2437880] [c0280394] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x15c/0x478
  [c24378d0] [c1263428] bpf_prepare_filter+0xbf8/0xc14
  [c2437990] [c12677ec] bpf_prog_create_from_user+0x258/0x2b4
  [c24379d0] [c027111c] do_seccomp+0x3dc/0x1890
  [c2437ac0] [c001d8e0] system_call_exception+0x2dc/0x420
  [c2437f30] [c00281ac] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x2c
  --- interrupt: c00 at 0x5a1274
  NIP:  005a1274 LR: 006a3b3c CTR: 005296c8
  REGS: c2437f40 TRAP: 0c00   Tainted: G        W           (6.13.0-rc6-PMacG4)
  MSR:  0200f932 <VEC,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI>  CR: 24004422  XER: 00000000

  GPR00: 00000166 af8f3fa0 a7ee3540 00000001 00000000 013b6500 005a5858 0200f932
  GPR08: 00000000 00001fe9 013d5fc8 005296c8 2822244c 00b2fcd8 00000000 af8f4b57
  GPR16: 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000002
  GPR24: 00afdbb0 00000000 00000000 00000000 006e0004 013ce060 006e7c1c 00000001
  NIP [005a1274] 0x5a1274
  LR [006a3b3c] 0x6a3b3c
  --- interrupt: c00

  The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at
   [f1000000, f1002000) created by:
   text_area_cpu_up+0x20/0x190

  The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
  page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x76e30
  flags: 0x80000000(zone=2)
  raw: 80000000 00000000 00000122 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff 00000001
  raw: 00000000
  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

  Memory state around the buggy address:
   f0ffff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
   f0ffff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  >f1000000: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
             ^
   f1000080: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
   f1000100: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
  ==================================================================

f8 corresponds to KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID which means the area is not
initialised hence not supposed to be used yet.

Powerpc text patching infrastructure allocates a virtual memory area
using get_vm_area() and flags it as VM_ALLOC. But that flag is meant
to be used for vmalloc() and vmalloc() allocated memory is not
supposed to be used before a call to __vmalloc_node_range() which is
never called for that area.

That went undetected until commit e4137f0 ("mm, kasan, kmsan:
instrument copy_from/to_kernel_nofault")

The area allocated by text_area_cpu_up() is not vmalloc memory, it is
mapped directly on demand when needed by map_kernel_page(). There is
no VM flag corresponding to such usage, so just pass no flag. That way
the area will be unpoisonned and usable immediately.

Reported-by: Erhard Furtner <erhard_f@mailbox.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250112135832.57c92322@yea/
Fixes: 37bc3e5 ("powerpc/lib/code-patching: Use alternate map for patch_instruction()")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/06621423da339b374f48c0886e3a5db18e896be8.1739342693.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>